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I. CONTRABAND OF WAR

1. Early Attitude toward Contraband
"The ·word contraband, Latin contrabandu1n~ implied disregard
of a decree or prohibition. The ·word ·was used in early times in referring to domestic restrictions usually upon trade in named articles
as in regard to trade in salt ·which often \Vas a government monopoly. Later prohibitions \Vere issued restricting \vithin specified areas
trade in materials \vhich might be of use in war.
"The prohibition on export of arms, ... "Tas common in Roman
and Byzantine periods \Vhen ~t \Vas extended to supplies ,vhich
might be serviceable to possible enemies. At times religious penalties
\Yere prescribed by the early church for those ,vho furnished \Var
materials to infidels. In these instances the measures taken \Vere
domestic or applied to those under the authority of the source of
the prohibitions and the prohibitions might be applied both in time
of peace and in time of \Var. Kings of England in the fourteenth
century issued prohibitions, sometimes in regard to furnishing articles to nationals of n~med states and sometimes in regard to
furnishing specified articles to any foreigner. England also made
treaties in this century prohibiting the supplying of specified
articles under penalty of forfeiture to the king ( Edw·ard III, 1370).
"Gradually the prohibitions aimed at regulating domestic trade
began to extend to the activities of foreign merchants in time of
\Var. This extension created the demand that for the security of
traders the list of prohibited areas should be made kno,vn either by
previous treaty agreement or by special proclamation, and such
action became usual from the seventeenth century. The early enumerations \vere not based on any uniform principle but \Vere often determined by political or other motives.
"It \Vas easy to extend the domestic prohibition of furnishing
certain goods to certain areas or to infidels by analogy to the furnishing of such goods to enemies.
"As belligerents \Vould have no authority over acts of traders
\Vithin neutral jurisdiction, they began to seize goods of the nature
of contraband \vhen these. "Tere outside of the immediate control
of the neutral state, as in transit on the high sea. Here there \Vould
be a degree of conflict bet\veen the rights of the neutral to protect
the shipping under its national flag and the right of the belligerent
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to prevent the delivery to his opponent of goods which might be used
for his defeat or injury. The right of the belligerent was to a
degree gradually conceded as dominant over the right of the neutral
trader, and the belligerent assumed the right to enumerate by proclamation, or otherwise to determine, what should be regarded as
under the ban.
·"The furnishing of contraband was, at first, regarded as an act
for which the state should be held responsible. Gradually the problem of supplying of contraband by subjects of neutral states gave
rise to controv~rsies. Attempts were made to extend to states responsibility for acts of their subjects. The discussions of these topics
were often by theologians because prohibitions, had been against
furnishing contraband to infidels and the course 9f argumentation
differed from modern discussions though involving like principles.
This was especially true of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries."
(United States Naval War College, International Law Situations_, ·

1933, 2-3.)

2. Mingling of Early and Modern Attitudes.
The mingling of the modern and earlier attitude is
demonstrated in the writing of Gentilis ( 1552-1608)
who emphasized the negative aspect of the Golden
Rule"that one should not do unto others what he would not that they
should do to him".
"Let no one have the power to transport wine, oil, or any liquid
to heathendom even to give them a taste, to say nothing of satisfying
the demands of trade." "Let 'no one dare to sell to alien heathen ...
coats of mail, shields, bows, arrows, broadswords, swords, or arm~
of any other sort whatsoever. Let absolutely no weapons be retailed
to them by anyone, and no iron at all, whether already made up ornot, for it would be harmful to the Roman Empire, and would
approach treason to furnish the heathen, who ought to be without
equipment, with weapons to make them stronger. But if anyone
shall have sold any kind of arms anywhere to alien heathen of any
nation whatsoever in violation of the interdicts of our holy r~ligion ,
we decree that all his goods be straightway confiscated, and then he
too suffer capital punishment." Gentilis, Hispanicae A dvocationis_,
bk. I, chap. XX); (United States Naval War College, Int ernational Law· Situations, 1933, 4.)
"The neutral began to demand that the evidence that the trade
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would be dangerous to the belligerent must also be clear not only
from the nature of the goods themselves which might, if going to
another neutral, be innocent, but that the goods if liable to capture
must have an enemy destination. The nature of the goods and the
destination thus became ea.rly determining factors in liability for
contraband." (United States Naval War College, International
Law Situations~ 1933, 4.)

Grotz" us ( 1583-1645) :
"But there often arises the question. What is permissible against
those who are not enemies, or do not ·want to be called enemies, but
who furnish our enemies with supplies? For we know that this
subject has been keenly debated in both ancient and modern times,
since some champion the relentlessness of \Varfare and others the
freedom of commercial relations.
"First, we must make distinctions ·with reference to the things
supplied. There are some. things, such as ·weapons, which are useful
only in war; other things which are of no use in war, as those
which minister to pleasure; and others still which are of use both
in time of war and at other times, as money, provisions, ships, and
naval equipment." (Carnegie Endo·wment for International Peace,
Grotius, De lure Belli ac Paci~ Vol. II, bk. III, chap. I, V, 601);
(United States Naval War College, International Law Situations~

1933, 4-5.)

3. Ez"ghteenth and Early f.lz"neteenth Centuries
By the time of the American Revolution no common treatment or definition of contraband had been
adopted by the nations of the world, but bilateral
treaties negotiated by the United States in the late ·
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries indicated
the trend toward adoption of the doctrine of "free
ships, free goods, except contraband of war." These
treaties further emphasized "character of the goods"
as a criterion of contrabc,tnd by the inclusion of lists
of articles, although attempts to establish definitive
lists of absolute and conditional contraband were not
generally favored until late in the nineteenth century.
Although the nature of contraband remained ob ..

4
scure during this period because of the conflicting
conceptions held by neutrals and belligerents, two
simple criteria of contraband emerged stronger than
before: ( 1) enemy destination and ( 2) belligeren~
purpose of the goods as described in appropriate
treaty lists. To be classed as contraband, goods had to
full fill both specifications. Ownership, neutral or enemy, of goods aboard a neutral vessel did not, in itself,
determine the status of the goods as contraband or
noncontraband despite the efforts of some neutral
countries which argued "free goods always free".
During this period of conflict and confusion, it
must be remembered, nations generally recognized ·
the right of belligerents to capture all enemy ships
as prizes and to seize all enemy-owned goods on
board. In regard to neutrally owned goods on board
the captured enemy ship, there was no clear rule to
apply, for some nations maintained that free or neutral goods are always free while others claimed that
neutral goods aboard an enemy ship, with the exception of contraband of war, are free.
1. ARTICLE 7. "All and every the subjects and inhabitants of the
Kingdom of Sweden, as well as those of the United States, shall
be permitted to navigate with their vessels, in all safety and freedom,
and without any regard to those to whom the merchandizes and cargoes may belong, from any port whatever, and the subjects and inhabitants of the two States shall likewise be permitted to sail and ·
trade with their vessels, and, with the same liberty and safety, to
frequent the places, ports, and havens of Powers enemies to both or
either of the contracting parties, without being in any wise molested
or troubled, and to carry on a commerce not only directly from the
ports of an enemy to a neutral port, but even from one port of an
enemy to another port of an enemy, whether it be under the jurisdiction o£ the same or of different Princes. And as it is acknowledged
by this treaty, with respect to ships and merchandizes, that free ships
shall make the merchandizes free, and that everything which shall
be on board of ships belonging to subjects of the one or the other
of the contracting parties shall be considered as free, even though
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the cargo, or a part of it, should belong to the enemies of one or
both, it is nevertheless provided that contraband goods shall always
be excepted; \vhich being intercepted, shall be proceeded against
according to the spirit of the follo\ving articles. It is likewise agreed
that the same liberty be extended to persons who may be on board
a free ship, unless they are soldiers in the actual service of the said
. "
enemies.
ARTICLE 8. "This liberty of navigation and commerce shall extend to all kinds of merchandizes, except those only which are
expressed in the follo\ving article, and are distinguished by the name
of contraband goods."
9. "Under the name of contraband or prohibited goods
shall be comprehended arms, great guns, cannon-balls, arquebuses,
musquets, mortars, bombs, petards, granadoes, saucisses, pitch-balls,
carriages, for ordnance. musquet-rests, bandoleers, cannon-po\vder,
matches, saltpetr·e, sulphur, bullets, pikes, sabres, swords, morions,
helmets, cuirasses, halbards, javelins, pistols and their holsters, belts,
bayonets, horses \vith their harness, and all other like kinds of arms
and instruments of \Var for the use of troops."
ARTICLE

10. "These \vhich follo\v shall not be reckoned in the
number of prohibited goods, that is to say. All sorts of cloths,
and all other manufactures of \vool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other
materials; all kinds of \vearing apparel, together \vith the things of
which they are commonly made; gold, silver coined or uncoined,
brass, iron, lead, copper, latten, ccals, \vheat, barley, and all sorts
of corn or pulse, tobacco; all kinds of spices sal ted and smoked
flesh, salted fish, cheese, butter, beer, oyl, \vines, sugar; all sorts of
salt and prov~isions \vhich serve for the nourishment and sustenance
of man. all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes, cables,
sails, sail-cloth, anchors, and any parts of anchors, ship-masts,
planks, boards, beams, and all sorts of trees and other things proper
for building or repairing ships. Nor shall any goods be considered as
contraband \vhich have not been \vorked into the form of any instrument or thing for the purpose of war by land or by sea, much
less such as have been prepared or wrought up for any other use, all
·which shall be reckoned free goods, as like\vise all others which are
not comprehended and ·particularly mentioned in the foregoing
article, so that they shall not by any pretended interpretation be
comprehended among prohibited or contraband goods. On the contrary, they may be freely transported by the subjects of the King
and of the United States, even to places belonging to an enemy,
such places only excepted as are besieged, blocked, or invested; and
ARTICLE
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these places only shall be considered as such which are nearly surrounded by one of the belligerent powers." (Treaty of Amity and
Comn1erce, United States and Sweden, 1783; Malloy, Treaties)
Conventions) II, 1727-8.)
2. ARTICLE 16. "This liberty of commerce and navigation shall extend to all kinds of merchandizes, excepting those only which are
distinguished by the name of contraband; and under this name of
contraband or prohibited goods shall be comprehended" 1st. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, s·wivels, blunderbusses, muskets, fuzees, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, svvords, sabres, lances,
sptars, halberds and grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls and all
other things belonging to the use of these arms.
"2d. Bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of mail, infantry
belts and clothes made up in the form and for a military use.
"3d. Cavalry belts, and horses vvith their furniture.
"4th. i\nd generally all kinds of arms ,and .instruments of Iron,
steel, brass and copper or of any other materials manufactured,
prepared and formed expressly to make war by sea or land."
ARTICLE 17. "All other merchandise and things not comprehended in these articles of contraband, expressly enumerated and classified as above, shall be held and considered as free and subjects
of free and lawful commerce, so that they may be carried and transported in the freest manner by both the contracting parties, even to
places belonging to an enemy, excepting only those places vvhich are
at that time besieged or blockaded; and, to avoid all doubt in this
particular, it is declared that those places are only besieged or blockaded which a.re actually attacked by a force capable of preventing
the entry of the neutral (Treaty, United States and Brazil, 1828;
United States Naval War College, International Law Situations)
1933,6.)

4. Late Nineteenth Century
With the Declaration of Paris, signed by representatives of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia,
Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey in 1856, the nations of
the world began to agree upon a forrnula for the
treatment of neutral commerce.

a

"2. Le pavilion neutre couvre la marchandise ennemie,
!'exception de la con trebande de guerre;
"3. La marchandise neutre, a !'exception de la contrebande de
guerre, n' est pas saississable sous pavilion ennemi; ... "
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("2. The neutral flag ccvers enemy goods ·with the exception of
contraband of vvar.
"3. Neutral goods, vvith the exception of contraband of vvar, are
not liable to capture under the enemy's flag.") (Declaration of
Paris, April 16, 1856; British and Foreig'n State PapersJ vol. 46.
27.)

Although the United States never signed the Declaration of Paris, provisions similar to those of the
Declaration of Paris were included in bilateral treaties concluded by the United States with other countries.
ARTICLE 15. "It shall be lavvful for the citizens of the United
States of America and of. the Republic of Bolivia, to sail 'vith their
ships, with all manner of liberty and security, no distinction being
made who are the proprietors of the merchandises laden thereon,
from ,any port to the places of those ,vho now are, or hereafter
shall be, at enmity 'vith either of the ,contracting parties. It shall
likewise be lawful for the citizens aforesaid to sail 'vith their ships
and merchandise before mentioned, and to trade 'vith the same
liberty and security, not only from places and ports of those who are
enemies of both or either party, to the ports of the other, and to
neutral places, but also from one place belonging to an enemy,
whether they be under the jurisdiction of one power or of several."
ARTICLE 16. "The t'vo high contracting parties recognize as
permanent and immutable the follovving principles, to wit:
"1st. That free ships make free goods: that is to say, that the
effects or goods belo·nging to subjects or citizens of a power or
State at 'var are free from c:tpture or confiscation when found
on board of neutral vessels, ,vith the exception of articles contraband
of war.
"2d. That the property of neutrals on board an enemy's vessel
is not subject to confiscation, unless the same be contraband of war.
"The like neutrality shall be extended tn persons who are on
board a neutral ship 'vit~ this effect, that although they may be
enemies to both or either party, they are not to be taken out of that
ship unless they are officers or soldiers, and in the actual service of
the enemies. The contracting parties engage to apply these principles to the commerce and navigation of ·all such powers and States
as shall consent to adopt them as permanent and immutable."
ARTICLE 17. "This liberty of navigation and commerce shall
extend to all kinds of merchandise, excepting those only which are

8
distinguished by the name of contraband of war, and under this
name shall be comprehended:
"1st. Cannons, mortars, howitzers, swivels, blunderbusses,
muskets, fuses, rifles, carbines, pistols, pikes, swords, sabers, lances,
spears, halberds, and grenades, bombs, powder, matches, balls, .
and all other things belonging to the use of these arms.
"2d. Bucklers, helmets, breastplates, coats of mail, infantry-belts
and clothes made up in the form and for ,a military use.
"3d. Cavalry-belts, and horses, with their furniture.
"4th. And, generally, all kinds of arms, offensive and defensive,
and instruments of iron, steel, brass and copper, or any other !llaterials manufactured, prepared and formed expressly to make war
by sea or land."
ARTICLE 18. "All other merchandise and things not comprehended in the articles of contraband explicitly enumerated and ·
classified as above, shall be held and considered as free, .and subjects
of free and lawful commerce, so that they may be carried and transported in the freest manner by the citizens of both the contracting
parties, even to places belonging to an enemy, excepting only those
places which are at that time besieged or blockaded; and to avoid
all doubt in his particular, it is de'Clared that those places or ports
only are beseiged or blockaded which .are actually attacked by a
belligerent force capable of preventing the entry of the neutral."
(Treaty, United States and Bolivia, 1858; Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, I, 118-9.)

Continuous Voyage and Contraband

.

.

The doctrine of continuous voyage was developed
by Great Britain in connection with the so-called
'Rule of 1756' and was applied by the British Prize·_
Courts only to trade between British Colonies and
foreign coun.tries, especially during the mercantilist
period. As far as we know, the courts of the United
States during the Civil War were the first to extend
and apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to the
carriage of contraband of war. No reported case before this time can be found in British courts 'vhere
this doctrine has been applied to contraband .
This doctrine was applied by the American courts
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against British shipping during the Civil War, and
this application seems to have been acceded to by the
British Government of the time. This application
was supported, moreover, by an international commission which sat under an Anglo-American treaty
of 1871. This commission, composed of an I tali an, an
American, and a British delegate, unanimously disallowed the claims made in the case of The Peterhoff.
The application of the doctrine of continuous voyage as in The Peterhoff provided a precedent for
British actions in World War I. After The Peterhoff
the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage
to absolute contraband shipped from one neutral
state to another with a belligerent state as the ultimate destination was adopted in general practice.
The doctrine could be applied to conditional contraband shipped from one neutral state to another
with a belligerent state as the ultimate destination
only if it could be proved that the goods were actually destined for the government, the military forces,
or some other governmental institution. In The Peterhoff the two types of contraband goods were distinguished, but the names "absolute" and "conditional" were not applied to them.
The application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to contraband necessitated, therefore, as in The
Peterhoff a clear distinction between absolute and
conditional contraband in the minds of the court and
an intensive examination by the court into the true
ultimate destination of goods shipped from one neutral state to another.
In the case of The Peterhoff, 1866, Justice Chase,
speaking for the United States Supreme Court, declared:
" . . . Thus far we have not thought it necessary to discuss the
question of actual destination beyond Matamoras. Nor need we

10
say more upon that general question than that we think it a fair
conclusion from the \vhole evidence that the cargo \Vas to be disposed of in l\1exico or Texas as might be found most convenient
and profitable to the o\vners and consignees, who were either at
Matamoras or on board the ship. Destination in this case becomes
specially important only in connection with the question of contra-band.
"And this brings us to the question: \Vas any portion of the
cargo of the Peterhoff contraband?
"The classification of goods as contraband or not contraband
has much perplexed text-·writers and purists. A strictly accurate
and satisfactory classification is perhaps impracticable; but that
which is best supported by American and English decisions may be
said to divide all m,e rchandise into three classes. Of these classes, the
first consists of ,articles manufactured and primarily and ordinarily
used for military purposes in time of \var; the second, of articles which may be and are used for purposes of war or peace, according to circumstances; and the third, of articles exclusiv,e ly us.ed for
peaceful purposes. Lawrence's vVheaton, 772-776, note; The
CommercenJ 1 Wheaton, 382, Dana's Wheaton, 629, note; Parsons', Mar. La-vv, 93-94. Merchandise of the first class, destined
to a belligerent, is ahvays con tr,aband; merchandise of the second
class is contraband only when actually destined to the military or
naval use of a belligerent; while merchandise of the third class is not
contraband at all, though liable to seizure and condemnation for
violation of blockade or siege.
.
"A considerable portion of the cargo of the Peterhoff -vvas of the
third class and need not be further referred to. A large portion,
perhaps, was of the second class, but is not proved, as we think,
to have been actually destined to belligerent use, and cannot therefore be treated as contraband. Another portion vvas, in our judg_ment, of the first class, or, if of the second, destined directly to the
rebel military service. This portion of the cargo consisted of the
cases of artillery harness, and of .a rticles described in the invoices as
"men's army bluchers," "artillery boots," and "government regulation gray blankets." These goods come fairly under the description of goods primarily and ordinarily used for military purposes
in time of w ar. They make part of the necessary equipment· of an
army.
"It is true that even these goods, if really intended for sale in the
m arket of lVI atamoras, \Vould be free of liability; for contraband
m ay be transported to neutrals to a neutr.al port, if intended to make
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part of its general stock in trade. But there is nothing in the case
which tends to convince us that such was their real destination,
while all the circumstances indicate that these articles, at least, were
destined for the use of the rebel forces then occupying Brownsville,
and other places in the vicinity.
"And contraband merchandise is subject to a different rule in respect to ulterior destination than that which applies to merchandise
not contraband. The latter is liable to capture only when a violation
of blockade is intended; the former when destined to the hostile
country, or to the actual military or naval use of the enemy, whether
blockaded or not. The trade of neutrals with belligerents in articles
not contraband is absolutely free, unless interrupted by blockade;
the conveyance by neutrals to belligerents of contraband articles is
always unlawful, and such articles may aways be seized during
transmit by sea. Hence, while articles, not contraband, might be
sent to Matamoras, and beyond to the rebel region, where the
communications were not interrupted by blockade, articles of a
contraband character, destined in fact to a State in rebellion, or for
the use of the rebel military forces, were liable to capture, though
primarily destined to Matamoras.
"We are obliged to conclude that the portion of the cargo 'vhich
we have characterized as contraband must be condemned." The
Peterlzoff~ 1866. An American Case. 5 Wall. 28. Briggs, H. W.,
T:lze Law of Nations~ (Nevv York, 1938) , 917-8.)

5. Twentieth Century Before World War I
Belligerent destination and purpose remained, at
the beginning of the twentieth century, as the general
criteria for contraband of war. Conscious efforts were
made to establish two definitive categories and lists
of contraband: ( 1) absolute and (2) conditional,
consequently adding refinements and conditions in
regard to destination and purpose. The doctrine of
continuous voyage was to apply only to absolute contrabrand.
1. Article 34. "The term 'contraband of war' includes only articles having a belligerent destination
and purpose. Such articles are classed under two
general heads:
" ( 1) Articles that are primarily and ordinarily used for military
purposes in time of war, such as arms and munitions of war, mili-
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tary m 1aterial, vessels of war, or instruments made for the immediate
manufacture of munitions of war.
"(2) A{rticles that may be and are used for purposes of war or
peace, according to circumstances."
"Articles of the first class, destined for ports of the enemy or
places occupied by his forces, are always contraband of war."
"Articles of the second class, vvhen actually and especially destined for the military or naval forces of the enemy, ,are contraband
of war." (United States Naval War Code of 1900. United States
Naval War College, International Law Discussions~ 1903, 82.)

2. During the Russo-Japanese War, the Vladivostok Prize Court condemned a shipment of flour,
part of the cargo on board the Arabia. The American Ambassador to Russia reported Russia's attitude
as being as follows:
" ... to unconditionally accept as noncontraband all merchandise
not universally accepted or described in their ov.rn rules as such
would open the door to contractors in Japan to import food stuffs
and other merchandise without limit for account of the Japanese
Government; that is, on account of or in destination of the enemy.
That the Russian Government could not but consider as contraband
a cargo of flour consigned to a port at which was quartered a large
body of troops, and that extending this principle the ultimate destination of the cargo had to be taken into consideration, although
its direct consignment might be to a merchant in an open port."
(Ambassador McCormick to Secretary of State Hay, Sept. 21,
1904, United States Foreign Relations~ 1904, 767-8.)

3. The Japanese Prize Courts in 1905 held that a
cargo of rock salt on board the Antiope vvas contraband because it was destined for preserving fish for
the Russian military forces. (Russian and Japanese
Prize Cases_, II, 389.)
4. The American attitude during this period
toward contraband is indicated partially in further
documents regarding the case of the Arabia.
"The same criterion of decision is announced by Kent, H.alleck,
and other authoritative publicists-that if the port be a general
commercial one, it is presumed that the articles are intended for
civil use, but if the great predominant character of the port is
. that of a port of naval equipment, it will be presumed that the
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articles \Vere going fior military use, and that the presumption of
innocence exists in all cases when they are destined to ,a commercial
port." (Instruction of Secretary of State Hay to Ambassador
McCormick, Jan. 13, 1905. United States Foreign Relations.,
1905, 747.)

In 1914 the Department of State instructed the
Charge d'Affaires in Russia to present a claim to the
Russian Govern1nent for the loss due to the condemnation of part of the flour.
". . . In the absence of information as to the consignees or of
the transaction in vvhich the flour here in question vvas involved,
the master . was not in a position to assert the fact of its private
commercial destination. Ho,vever, this does not in any \Vay affect
the views of this Government in relation to the case under discussion, namely, in ·the absence of consignment to enemy authorities or
to an enemy contractor \Vho as a matter of common kno,vledge
supplied articles of this kind to the enemy, or to a fortified place of
the enemy or to another place serving as a base for the armed forces
of the enemy, the non-hostile destination of the flour '\Vas to be presumed, and therefore that the burden of proving the non-hostile
destination of the flour \Vas not cast upon the O\Vners or their
representatives, but that it \Vas for the captors to prove its hostile
destination." (The solicitor for the Department of State, Johnson,
to the Charge d'A.ffaires ad interim in Russia, Wilson, July 2,
1914; Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest of International Law., VII, 79.)

5. In a case involving an American shipping company which had canceled a contract for carrying flour
to Japan because Russia had declared "provisions"
to be contrband, the follo,ving opinion was expressed
by an American court:
"Flour may probably be considered as a provision prepared for
immediate use; but as to \vhether it \Vas designed that the product
in the present instance should go to a naval or military equipment
station, there is no proof except that Japan \vas in a state of vvar.
Ordinarily, therefore, the presumption \vould prevail that the flour
\vas going to Japan for civil use, and would not be contraband except that it -vvas declared to be so by one of the belligerents. Perhaps
a mere declaration by a belligerent nation that articles of commerce
are contraband, \Vhen by the rules of internationalla,v they are not,
would not make them so. But here is a proclamation touching pro-
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v1s10ns that rest upon the border line, and depend for their real
char.acter upon the particular state of the port of their destination,
whether engaged in civil pursuits only, or in the equipping of either
the army or the navy with war supplies. It would seem that, under
such conditions, the proclamation of one of the governments at war ·
would be effective to impress the provisions with the character of
contraband. Ait any rate, I am inclined so to treat the flour concerned here." (Balfour~ Guthrie and Co. v. Portland and Asiatic
S. S. Co.~ 167 Fed. 1010, 1015. (D. Oreg., 1909.)

6. In regard to contraband, Secretary of State Root
charged the American delegates to the Hague Conference of 1907 as follows :
" ... It is of the highest importance that not only the rights but
the duties of neutrals shall be most clearly and distinctly defined and understood, not only because the evils which belligerent nations
bring upon themselves ought not to be allowed to spread to their
peaceful neighbors and inflict unnecessary injury upon the rest of
mankind, but because misunderstandings regarding the rights and
duties of neutrals constantly tend to involve them in controversy
with one or the other belligerent.
"For both of these reasons, special consider,ation should be given
to an agreement upon what shall be deemed to constitute contraband of war. There has been a recent tendency to extend widely
the list of articles to be treated as contrahand; and it is probable
that if the belligerents themselves are to determine at the beginning of a war what shall be contraband, this tendency vvill continue
until the list of contraband is m,a.de to include a large proportion of
all the articles which are the subject of commerce, upon the ground
that they will be useful to the enemy. When this result is reached,
especially if the doctrine that free ships make free goods and the
doctrine that blockades in order to be binding must be effective,
as well as .any rule giving immunity to the property of belligerents
at sea, will be deprived of a large part of their effect, and vve
shall find ourselves going baclnvard instead of fonvard in the
effort to prev.e nt every \V"ar from becoming universally disastrous.
The exception of contraband of war in the Declaration of Pari~ will
be so expanded as to very largely destroy the effect of the declaration. On the other hand, resistance to this tendency tow;ard the
expansion of the list of contraband ought not to be left to the
neutrals affected by it at the very moment when vvar exists, because
that is the precess by which neutrals become themselves involved
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in war. You should do all in your power to bring about ,an agreement upon vvhat is to constitute contraband; and it is very desirable
that the list should be limited as narrovvly as possible." (Secretary
of State Root to the Delegates of the United States to the Hague
Conference of 1907, lVIay 31, 1907; United States Foreign Relations_, 1907, pt. 2, 1138.)

7. The Hague Conference of 1907 came to no
agreement on this subject, but the Declaration of
London in 1909 embodied many provisions for contraband. An elaborate attempt was made through the
Declaration of London to list all articles entering
into commerce in three categories: ( 1) absolute contraband, ( 2) conditional contraband, and ( 3) never
contraband.
Article 22. "The follovving articles may, vvithout notice, be
treated as contraband of war, under the name of absolute contrahand:
" ( 1) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes,
and their distinctive component parts.
" ( 2) Projectiles, charges and cartridges of all kinds, and their
distinctive component parts.
" ( 3) Power and explosives specially prepared for use in war.
" ( 4) Gun-mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military vvagons,
field forges, and their distinctive component parts.
" ( 5) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.
" ( 6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.
" ( 7) Saddle, draught, and p.ack animals suitable for use in war.
" ( 8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts.
" ( 9) Armour plates.
" ( 10) Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such ;a nature that they can only be used on a
vessel of war.

" (I 1) Implements and. apparatus designed exclusively for the
manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of
arms, or war materi.al for use on land or sea."
ARTICLE 23. "Articles .e xclusively used for \Var may be added
to the list of absolute contraband by a declaration, which must be
notified.
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"Such notification must be addressed to the Governments of
. other Powers, or .to their representatives accredited to the Power
making the declaration. A notification made after the outbreak of
hostilities is addressed only to neutral Powers."
ARTICLE 24. "T:he following articles, susceptible of use in war
as well as for purposes of peace, may, without notice, be treated as.
contraband of war, under the name of conditional contraband:
" ( 1 ) Foodstuffs.
" ( 2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding anim.als.
" ( 3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war.
'' ( 4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money.
" ( 5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their
component parts.
" ( 6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts
of docks and their component parts.
" ( 7) Railway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs·, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.
" ( 8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together with accessories and articles recogniz;able as
intended for use in connection with balloons and flying machines.
" ( 9) Fuel; lubricants.
" ( 10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use
In war.
" ( 11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the
same.
" ( 12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials.
" ( 13) Harness and saddlery.
" ( 14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of
nautical instruments."
ARTICLE 25. "Articles susceptible for use in war as well as for
purposes of peace, other than those enumerated in Articles 22 and·
24, may be added to the list of conditional contraband by a declara- ·
tion, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the
second paragraph of Article 23."
ARTICLE 26. "If a Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the
right to treat as contraband of war an article comprised in any of
the classes enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, such intention shall
be announced by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23."
ARTICLE 27. "Articles which are not susceptible of use In war
may not be declared contraband of war."
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ARTICLE 28. "The following may not be declared contraband
of '~ar:
" ( 1) Ra'v cotton, \vool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other ra\V
materials of the textile industries, and yarns of the same.
" ( 2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra.
" ( 3) Rubber, resins, gums, and lacs; hops.
" ( 5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and
phosphates for agricultural purposes.
" ( 6) Metallic ores.
" ( 7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks,
slates, and tiles.
" ( 8) Chinaware and glass.
" ( 9) Paper and paper-making materials.
" ( 10) Soap, paint and colors, including articles exclusively used
in their manufacture, and varnish.
" ( 11) Bleaching po\vder, soda ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and sulphate of copper.
" ( 12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery.
" ( 13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-ofpearl, and coral.
" ( 14) Clocks and \vatches, other than chronometers.
" ( 15) Fashion and fancy goods.
" ( 16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles.
" ( 17) Articles of household furniture and decoration ; office
furniture and requisites."
ARTICLE 29. "Like\vise the following may not be treated as
contraband of war:
" ( 1) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded.
They can, ho,vever, in case of urgent military necessity and subject
to the payment of compensation, be requisitioned, if their destination is that specified in Article 30.
" ( 2) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in \vhich they
are found, as \vell as those intended for the use of her cre'v and
passengers during the voyage."
ARTICLE 30. "Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is
sho\vn to be destined to territory belonging to or occupied by the
enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is immaterial
\vhether carriage o"f the goods is direct or entails transshipment
or a subsequent transport by land."
ARTICLE 31. "Proof of the destination specified in Article 30
is complete in the following cases:
" ( 1) When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy
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port, or for delivery to the armed forces of the enemy.
" ( 2) When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she
is to touch at an enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy
before reaching the neutral port for which the goods in question
are documented."
ARTICLE 32. "Where a vessel is carrying .absolute contraband, her papers are conclusive proof as to the voyage on which she is
engaged, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated by
her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such
deviation."
ARTICLE 33. "Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it
is shown to be destined for the use of the armed forces or of a
government department of the enemy State, unless in this latter
case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used
for the purposes of the wa.r in progress. This latter exception does _
not apply to a consignment coming under Article 24 ( 4) ."
ARTICLE 34. "The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to enemy authorities, or
to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as a matter
of common knovvledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy.
A similar presumption arises if the goods are consigned to ,a fortified place belonging to "the enemy, or other place serving as a base
for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, however,
arises in the case of a merchant vessel bound for one of these
places if it is sought to prove that she herself is contraband.
"In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed to be innocent.
"The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted."
ARTICLE 35. "Conditional contraband is not liable to capfure,
except when found on board a vessel bound for terri tory belonging
to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of the enemy,·
and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port.
"The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage
on which the vessel is engaged and as to the port of discharge of
the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the course indicated
by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such
deviation."
ARTICLE 36. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35,
conditional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred
to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases ,vhere the enemy
country has no seaboard."
ARTICLE 37. "A vessel carrying goods liable to capture as ab-
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solute or conditional contraband may be captured on the high seas
or in the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the whole
· of her voyage, even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching
the hostile destination."
ARTICLE 38. "A vessel may not be captured on the ground that
she has carried contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage
is in point of fact at an end."
ARTICLE 39. "Contraband goods are liable to condemnation."
ARTICLE 40. "A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned
if the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or
freight, forms more than half the cargo."

'-

ARTICLE 41. "If a vessel carrying contraband is released, she
may be condemned to pay the costs and expenses incurred by the
captor in respect of the proceedings in the national prize cour/
and the custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings."
ARTICLE 42. "Goods \vhich belong to the o\vner of the contraband and are on board the same vessel are liable to condemnation."
ARTICLE 43 . ."If a vessel is encountered at sea \vhile unaware
of the outbreak of hostilities of the declaration of contraband which
applies to her cargo, the contraband cannot be condemned except
on payment of compensation; the vessel herself and the remainder
of the cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and
expenses referred to in Article 41. The same rule applies if the
master, after becoming a\vare of the outbreak of hostilities, or of
the declaration of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging the contraband.
"A vessel is deemed to be a\vare of the existence of a state of war,
or of a declaration of contraband, if she left a neutral port subsequently to the notification to the Po\ver to \vhich such port
belongs of the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of
contraband respectively, provided that such notification was made
in sufficient time. A vessel is also deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port after the outbreak
of hostilities."
ARTICLE 44. "A vesse~ which has been stopped on the ground
that is she carrying contraband, and which is not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board, may,
when the circumstances permit, be allo\ved to continue her voyage
if the master is willing to hand over the contraband to the
belligerent warship.
"The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor
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on the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master must give the
captor duly certified copies of all relevent papers.
"The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been
handed over to him under these conditions." (Declaration of London, 1909. Not ratified. Correspondence and Documents Respecting_
the International Naval ConferenceJ held in London, Dec. 1908F:eb. 1909, Parliamentary PapersJ [Cd. 4554], Misc. No. 4
( 1909) ' 78-84. )

8. In 1910 Russia, in answer to an American claim
on behalf of the American owners of cargo of kerosene, seized and condemned by Russia during the
Russo-Japanese War, declared:
"The Court of course could not but take note of the decisive
circumstance in this instance that had the destination of the 'Oldhamia's' cargo really been innocent and not destined for military
purposes, the following characteristic facts, thoroughly verified in
Court, certainly could not have occurred:
" ( 1) At the moment of her detention by the Russian cruiser the
steamer 'Oldhamia' was proceeding ~vithout lights.
"(2) Upon detention of the vessel no charter-party was produced to the Russian naval authorities during the examination of
the steamer and cargo.
" ( 3) The manifest stated that the vessel was to discharge at
HongKong, 'vhereas when detained she vvas proceeding from
HongKong in the direction of Japan.
" ( 4) Similar incorrect evidence as to the course of the vessel to
HongKong was given by the crew of the 'Oldhamia' during the
examination.
" ( 5) Subsequently, upon searching the vessel, there was found
correspondence addressed to the Captain of the 'Oldhamia' fromwhich it was made clear that the cargo had been accepted by the
steamer from the Standard Oil Company especially for carriage to
Japan.

"These facts are of course of the first importance, and the conduct of the Captain and crew-especially as the question is one
of 'relative' contraband, i. e., liable to confiscation only if destined
for military purposes-proved in this instance the deciding factor
in arriving at a conclusion respecting the hostile or harmless destination of the cargo. The Imperial Government therefore can in no
way agree with the point of vie':v of the note of July 10/23 declaring that 'the character of the cargo itself is the sole essential question
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here, and the conduct of the crew has no significance'. In contradistinction to cases of carriage of absolute contraband-where such
argument (with certain reservations) generally speaking would
be true-in cases of carriage of relative contraband, its character
(i.e., the real distinction of the cargo) is often ascertained precisely from the conduct of the crevv, and such facts as for instance
the concealment of papers or the false evidence of the crew, from the
point of vie\v of modern international la\v, are unquestionably
decisive in the sense of presumption of the military destination of the
cargo, which is liable in such event to confiscation . . . " (The
Oldhamia~ 1910. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~
VII, 65-6. See Russian and Japanese Prize Cases~ I, 145.)
9. "It is not seen ... that according to the Declaration of London,
the misleading character of the ship's papers in this case and the
action of the Captain and crew raised a presumption of hostile destination. They simply destroyed the value of the ship's papers as
evidence of the destination, and apparently showed that the vessel
\Vas destined, generally, to Japan. Their destination in Japan is still
presumed innocent, unless the consignment is addressed or destined,
as set forth in Article 34, and it is not understood that there is any
direct proof thereof in this case." (Memorandum of the Office of
the Solicitor for the United States Department of State, Nov. 22,
1910 in regard to The Oldhamia and the Russian reply to the
A:merican claim. Hackworth, G. H ., Digest of International Law~

VII, 66.)
10. "In 1800 an American vessel carrying an American-owned
cargo which included seven horses, bound to the British island of
Antigua, was seized by a French privateer, and the vessel and cargo
were condemned by a French prize court, inter alia~ for carriage of
contraband. The Court of Claims, passing on this as one of the
French Spoliation Claims, upheld the findings of the French court
the Antigua was a base of military and naval equipment. The
court stated that whether horses vvere contraband depended on the
probable use to be made of them at their destination and that such
use was presumed to be hostile because of the character of the
port." (The Brig Rensalaer, 1913. Commentary, Hackworth, G.
H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 70. See 49 Court of Claims

1.)
11. "An American brig sailed in 1797 from Baltimore bound for
the Swedish island of St. B:artholomew, carrying a cargo of provisions. The vessel was shown to have the Britsh island of Antigua
as 'its real destination. It was seized on the high seas in the vicinity
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of Antigua by a French privateer and condemned by a French prize
court for carrying food assumed to be for the British Army at Antigua. The Court of Claims-passing on this as one of the French
Spoliation Claims-held that the condemnation was illegal regardless of the treaty of 1778 between the United States and France:
The court examined at some length the situation prevailing on the
island at the time, including the fact that a food shortage existed,
that slaves were greatly in the majority, and that troops were held
there to guard against an uprising, 'and concluded that 'All of the
foregoing goes to negative any presumption that food-stuffs destined
for the island of Antigua were for the supply of a few troops- stationed there.'" The Brig Sally~ 1915, Commentary, Hackworth, G.
H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 70. See 50 Court of Claims
129, 136.)

12. The following dispatch of October 19, 1911
shows that the Declaration of London of 1909 was
operative during the Turco-Italian War in 1911-12:
"By a royal decree of October 13 the following instructions were
approved in conformity with the. principles of the Declaration of
P,aris, April 16, 185~, which belligerent countries are bound to respect, with the rules of The Hague Conventions of October 18,
1907, and of the Declaration of London of rebruary 26, 1909,
which the Government of the King desires to be respected as well,
so far as the provisions of the laws in force in the Kingdom allow,
although they have not yet been ratified by Italy; and they will
serve to regulate the conduct of naval commanders in the operations of capture and prize during the war." (United States Naval
War College, International Law Situations~ 1912, 108.)

6. World War I.
At the outbreak of World War I, most of the pro- visions of the Declaration of Paris and the unratified
Declaration of London were followed by the warring nations in treating neutral and enemy commerce.
As the war continued some of these provisions were
retained, but most of them were altered as methods
of warfare developed and conditions changed.
( 1) Rules as of 1914.
1. In 1914 the following propositions concerning
contraband were generally accepted as law:
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1. "Even enemy goods are safe on a neutral ship,

if

they are not

contraband . . . . "
2. "Neutral goods are safe even on an enemy ship, if they are
not contraband .... "
3. "A fortiori_, neutral goqds are safe on a neutral ship but only
if they are not contraband .... "
4. "Contraband goods are divided into t\VO catagories: absolute
and conditional."
5. "Absolute contraband consists of goods exclusively used for
\var and destined for an enemy country, even if passing through a
neutral country en ~oute; the rule of 'continuous voyage' applies."
6. "Conditional contraband consists of goods \vhich may have a
peaceful use but \vhich are also susceptible of use in \var and \vhich
are destined for the armed forces or a government department of a
belligerent state; the rule of 'continuous voyage' does not apply."
(P. C. Jessup's preface to Neutrality_, Its History_, Economics and
Law: vol. III, The World War Period (Turlington, 1936), x.)
2. "The sale or shipment of contraband of \\'"ar by citizens of the
United States to citizens or subjects of any of the belligerent po\vers,
in course of commerce, is not prohibited by the neutrality la\vs or
the President's proclamation. But contraband, \vhether shipped
in vessels of the belligerents or neutrals, is subject to seizure and
confiscation by the belligerents, and \Vhen so seized is not entitled
to the protection or intervention of this Government."
"When absolute contraband is destined to one of the countries
at war_, w,hether to the government or to an indiv.idual of that
country_, it is subject to seizure and confiscation by any of the opposing belligerents \vhen beyond the territory of the neutral government from \vhich it is shipped."
"Vessels flying the flag of one of the belligerents are subject to
seizure and confiscation by the opposing belligerents. Contraband of
\var on board of such vessel is, of course, subject to confiscation,
though the property of a neutral.
"Goods, not contraband, belonging to a neutral aboard a captured
vessel are subject to delay and interruption consequent upon the seizure of the vessel, but not to confiscation, upon manifestation of
neutral o\vnership and the non-contraband character of the goods.
"When a vessel containing cargo of a citizen of the United
States is captured and is carried before a prize court, as it \Vill be
presumably, he should give notice of his claim of property to the
p11ize-court authorities and be prepared to furnish proof of his
o\vnership and the non-contraband character of his goods.
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"Goods of a neutral, not contraband of war, shipped on a neutral
vessel are not rightfully subject to seizure or confiscation by any of
the belligerents, and it is not presumed that the vessels of neutrals
carrying only non-contraband cargoes will be interfered with."
Contraband. of war "is ranked und~r two heads, namely, absolute
and cond,itional." Absolute contraband "includes those article·s
which are peculiarly adapted to war, such as arms and ammunition
and military and naval equipment." Conditional contraband "consists, generally speaking, of articles which are susceptible of use in
war as well as for purposes of peace," and, therefore, "their destination determines whether they are contraband or non-contraband." (Public circular issued by the Department of State, j\u~.
15, 1914; United States Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement,
274-7.)
3. "His Majesty's Government cordially concur in the principle
enunciated by the Government of the U nitedl States that a belliger- ·
ent, in dealing with trade between neutrals, would not interfere
unless such interference is necessary to protect the belligerent's
national safety, and then only to the extent to which this is necessary. We shall endeavor! to keep our action within the limits of this
principle on the understanding that it admits our right to interfere
when such interference is not with bona fidei. trade between the
United States and another neutral country, but with trade in contraband destined for the) enemy's country, and we are ready, whenever our action may unintent:ionally exceed this principle, to make
redress." (British Foreign Office reply to American note. Ambassador Page to Secretary of State Bryan, telegram, Jan. 7, 1915;
United States Foreign Relations} 1915, Supplement} 299-300.)

Changes in Contraband Lists.
The government of the United States attempted to
gain in the early days of the war a general agreement
to the Declaration of London from all belligerents.
The belligerents, however, declared it necessary to
transfer certain goods, aircraft for example, from the
conditional to the absolute list. Such transfers. were
even allowed under the terms of the unratified Declaration of London. Although there was n1uch interchange of opinion bet,veen the belligerents and neutrals in regard to contraband, no general agreement
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\Vas ever reached. As the war continued, the belligerents surpassed each other in going beyond the
ordinary bounds of international la,v, using retaliation in self-defense as a justification for avoiding its
obligations under international law. The generally
\Veaker neutral nations had to submit to these actions.
In the case of contraband lists, the lists remained, but
as goods \Vere rapidly shifted from the free to the
conditional and then to the absolute list, the distinction between absolute and conditional disappeared.
By the end of the war, all contraband \vas absolute
contraband, for with total warfare it was soon presumed that all goods even food stuffs, were destined
to the enemy government.
1. "On August 6, 1914, the American Secretary of State addressed to the American Ambassadors in the belligerent states and the
Minister to Belgium an inquiry as to whether the respective states
were '-willing to agree that the laws of naval vvarfare laid down by
the Declaration of London, 1909, shall be applicable to naval vvarfare during the present European! conflict, provided that the governments vvith 'vhom' they were or might be at vvar also agree to
such application. The Secretary also said, 'You will further state
that this Government believes that acceptance of these lavvs by the
belligerents would prevent grave misunderstandings which may
arise as to the relations benveen belligerent and neutral povvers. It ,
therefore, earnestly hopes that this inquiry may receive favorable
consideration.'" (United States Naval War College, International
Law Situations~ 1933, 10; United States Foreign Relations~ 1914,
Supplement~ 216.)
2. "The British Government had on August 5, 1914, made
known that it would regard as contraband the articles named as
absolute and conditional contraband in the Declaration of London
with the transfer of aircraft from the conditional to the absolute
list." (United States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933, 10; United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supple7nent~ 215-6.)

3. For British-lists and changes therein, see United
States Foreign Relations 1914, Supplenlent 215-216,
236, 245, 261-262, 269-270; United States Foreign
1

1
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Relations, 1915, Supplement, 137, 160, 165, 174-177;
United States Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement,
385-387, 405, 453, 486; United States Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement I, 492; United States Foreign
Relations, 1918, Supplement I, 917-918.
French contraband lists conformed to the British.
4. At the beginning of the war, the German and
Austro-Hungarian Governments announ,ced that
their lists of contraband would conform to those in
the Declaration of London. For these lists and later
changes, see United States Foreign Relations, 1914,
Supplement, 216, 222, 266; United States Foreign
Relations, 1915, Supplement, 162-163, 607; United
States Foreign Relations, 1916, Supplement, 281.
5. Japan also announced a list which conformed
to the Declaration of London except for the inclusion
of aircraft as absolute contraband. See United States
Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement, 179; United
States Naval War College, I ntern~tional Law Do cum ents, 1925, 146, 152.
6. " . . . The United States stands ready ·e ither to accept the
declaration as a whole, provided all of the belligerents accept 1t, or,
to accept it for the period of the war with modifications and additions acceptable, on the one hand, to the United States and the
Netherlands, the two neutral signatories, and, on the other hand,
to all of the belligerents.
"This Government in seeking general acceptance of the declaration as a code of naval warfare for the present war had in mind
the adoption of the declaration as a whole and not such part of it
as might be acceptable to certain belligerents and not to other belligerents. It considered that the declaration was to be applied as a
complete code of which no rule could be ignored or supplemented,
and in so doing it followed A;rticle 65 of the declaration, which
stipulates: 'The provisions of the present declaration must be treated as a whole and cannot be separated.'
"The only reasonable explanation for the inclusion in the declaration of this requirement is that the instrument is composed largely
of compromises on the part of the government represented at the
conference. Although the declaration is introduced with a general
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statement that 'the signatory powers are agreed' that the rules
contained in the declaration 'correspond in substance with the
generally recognized principles of international law,' the proceedings of the conference as \Veil as the documents relating to it
prove that an agreement on many of the articles was reached
through reciprocal concessions. Being conceived in compromise and
concession the declaration was accepted by the Government of the
United States at th e conference in London in the earnest hope that
it might finally compose the differences vvhicb: existed as to neutral
rights and neutral duties, although in so accepting this Government
was compelled to abandon certain rules of conduct which it has
heretofore always maintained.
7. "As might be expected in a settlement of divergent views and
practices by mutual concession the Declaration of London contains
provisions both advantageous and disadvantageous to the respective
interests of neutrals and bellige.rents. But it is now proposed by
Great Britain to retain all the provisions favorable to belligerents
and to recast other provisions so that they will be less favorable to
neutral interests. The result is a set of rules which limits neutrals'
rights far more than does the declaration itself treated as a whole.
War, in any event, bears heavily upon a neutral nation. The interruption of its commerce and the limitations placed upon its trade
are sufficiently burdensome under the rules of t'he Declaration of
London. In consenting to those rules the Government of the United
States made great concessions on its part and it does not feel that it
can, in justice to its own people, go further. It cannot consent to
the retention of a part of this compromise settlement and to th e
rejection of another part. The adoption of the declaration so
modified is contrary to the customary procedure incident to compromise settlements, to the express provisions of the declaration itself, and to the spirit which induced its signature." (Acting Secretary of State, Sept. 26, 1914. (United Stl{lltes Foreign Relations_,
1914, Supplement_, 227. United States Naval War College, International Law Situations_, 1933, 11-12.) .
8. "A discussion of the provisions of the order in council followed
in which the Ambassador said that he agreed that the Order in
Council practically made foodstuffs absolute contraband, which
was contrary to the British traditional policy as well as to that of
the United States. He said that the immediate cause had been the
introduction through Rotterdam in first days of the war of large
quantities of food supplies for the German army in Belgium, and
that it seemed absolutely necessary to stop this traffic.
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"I replied that, while I appreciated that such reasons must weigh
very heavily with those responsible for the successful conduct of the
\var, it seemed unfortunate that some other means could not have
been found to accomplish the desired purpose, either by getting the
Netherlands to place an embargo on foodstuffs and other conditional contraband or by agreeing not to export such articles. The
Ambassador said that he agreed that would. be much the better
way, and that he believed it could be done.
"He said that now the chief anxiety to be in regard to shipments
of copper and petrole~m and also of S·wedish iron, and that the
British Government was stopping vessels with such cargoes and purchasing them. He suggested that possibly the difficulty created by the
Order in Council could be removed by rescinding it and adding
to the list of absolute contraband petroleum · products, copper,
barbed wire and other articles of like nature now used almost exclusiv,ely for war purposes.
"I said that as to this suggestion I could not speak for the Government but that it seemed worthy of consideration as it might offer
a means of getting rid of the order in council ·which certainly menaced the very friendly relations existing if it became the subject of
discussion by the press. I told- him that I did not think that the
feeling which the Order in Council would arouse when generally
understood, would be among the shippers as much as among the
American public at large; and that, even if no case arose under it,
the fact that the British Government had issued a decree, which
menaced the commercial rights of the United States as a neutral,
in violation of the generally accepted rules of international law,
would undoubtedly cause irritation, if not indignation, and might
change the sentiment of the American people, of which Great
Britain had no reason to complain at the present tin1e." (A m,e morandum of a conference of Acting Secretary Lansing with the British
Ambassador on September 29, 1914. United States Foreign Relations., 1914, Supplement., 234. United States Naval War College,
International Law Situations., 1933, 12-13.)
9. "The desire of this Government is to obtain from the British
Government the issuance of an Order in Council adopting the
declaration without any amendment whatsoever and to obtain from
France and Russia like decrees, which they will undoubtedly issue
if Great Britain sets the example. Such an adoption by the allied
Governments will put in force the acceptance of the Declaration
of London by Germany and Austria, which 'vill thus become for
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all the bellige rent powers th e cod e of naval wa rfare du r ing the
present conflict. 'l'his is th e ai1n of th e United States.
"It cannot be accmnplished if the declaration is changed in any
way as Gern1any and Austria would not give their conse nt to a
change.
"In the frequ cn t informal and confidenti al con ve rsations \vhich
have taken place here and in t he admirable frankn ess \vith \vhich
Sir Ed\var d Grey has stated the reasons for the action which Great
Britain has deetn ed it necessa ry to take in regard to the declaration,
this Governmen t feels that it fu lly u nderstands and appreciates th e
B ritish pos,i tion , an d is not d isposed to place obst acles in the way
of th e accomplishment of th e purposes w hich th e. British representatives have so f r an kly stated.
" T 'he confide nce thus reported in this· Gove rnment makes it appreciate more th an ever the staunch f r iendship of Great Britai n for
th e U nited States, \vhich it hopes al·ways to deserve.
"1'his Government \vould not fe el ·war r anted in offering any
suggesti on to the British Government as ~to a course which would
m eet the wishes of this Government and at the same time accomplish the ends ·which Great Britain seeks, but you migh t in the
strictest confidence intimate to Sir Edward Grey the following
pl an , at the same time stating very explicitly that it is your personal
suggestion and not one for which your Government is responsible.
"Let the British Government issue an Order in Council accepting the Declaration of London without change or addition, and
repealing all previous conflicting orders in council.
"Let this Order in Council be followed by a proclamation adding
articles to the lists of absolute and conditional contraband by virtue
of the authority conferred by ATticles 23 and 25 of the declaration.
"Let the proclamation be followed by another Order in Council,
of vvhich the United States need not be pr·e:viously advised, declaring
that, \vhen one of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State is
convinced that a port or the territory of a neutral country is being
used as a base for the transit of supplies for an enemy government
a proclamation shall issue declaring that such port or territory has
acquired enemy character in so far as trade in contraband is concerned and that vessels trading there\vith shall be thereafter subject
to the rules of the declaration governing trade to enemy's territory.
"It is true that the latter Order in Council would be based on a
new principle. The excuse \vould be that the Declaration of London
failing to provide for such an exceptional condition as exists, a belligerent has a right to give a reasonable interpretation to the rules
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of the declaration so that they will not leave him helpless to prevent
an enemy from obtaining supplies for his military forces although
the belligerent may possess the power and would have the right to
do so if the port or territory was occupied by the enemy.
"When the last-mentioned Order in Council is issued, I am convinced that a full explanation of its nature and necessity would
meet the liberal consideration by this Government and not be the
subject of serious objection.
"I repeat that any suggestion, which you may make to Sir Ed\vard Grey, must be done in an entirely personal way and with the
distinct understanding that this Government is in no way responsible for what you may say." (Telegram from the Department of
State to the Arnerican Ambassador in Great Britain, October 16,
1914. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement, 249.
United States Naval War College, lnternatianal Law Situations~

1933, 14-16.)
10. "1"he question seems wholly different here from what is probably seen1s in Washington. T'here it is a more or less academic
discussion. Here it is a matter of life and death for English-speaking civilization. It is not a happy time to raise controversies that can
be avoided or postponed. Nothing can be gained and every chance
for useful cooperation for peace can easily be thrown a way and is
now in jeopardy. In jeopardy also are our friendly relations with
Great Britain in the sorest time of need in her history. I know that
this is the correct, larger view." (Telegram from the Ainerican
Ambassador in Great Britain to the D·epartment of State. United
States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement, 248. United States
Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933, 16.)
"Beg that you will not regard the position of this Government
as merely academic. Contact ·with opinion on this side the water
would materially alter your vie·w. Lansing has pointed out to you
in personal confidential despatch of this date hovv completely all
the British Government seeks can be accomplished without the least
friction with this Government and \vithout touching opinion on this
side the water on an exceedingly _tender spot. I must urge you to
realize this aspect of the matter and to use your utmost persuasive
efforts to effect an understanding, \vhich we earnestly desire, by
the method we have gone out of our vvay to suggest, \Vhich \vill put
the whole case in unimpeachable form.
"This is private end for your guidance."
"Woodro\v vVilson"
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( P resident of the United States to the J\n1erican Ambassador in
Great Britain. United States Foreign Re!ationsJ 1914, SupplementJ
252. United States Naval War College, lntenzational Law Eituatio nsJ 1933 , 16. )

12.

" 1~·h ere is no Hague convention ·which deals vvith absolute or

conditional cont raband, and, as th e Declaration of London is not in
force, th e rules of in ter national law only apply. A s to the articles
to be regarded as con traband, th ere is no general agreement betvveen
nations. It is the practice for a cou nt ry, either in time of peace
or a fte r the outbreak of wa r , to declare the articles which it will
consider as absolute or condition al con traband. It is true that a
neutral government is seriously affected by this declaration, as
the rights of its subj ects of citizens m ay be irnp aired. But the
rights and interests of belligerents and neutrals are opposed in
respect to contraband articles and trade and there is no tribunal
to 'vhich questions of difference may be readily submitted.
"The record of the United States in the past is not free from
criticism. When neutral, this Government has stood fo r a restricted
list of absolute and conditional contraband. A s a belligerent,
we have contended for a liberal list, according to our conception
of the necessities of the case. (Secretary of State Bryan to Senator
Stone, January 20, 1915. United States Foreign Relat io nsJ 1914,
SupplementJ ix.)
13. "Petrol and other petroleum products have been proclaimed
by Great Britain as contraband of war. In vi·ew of the absolute
necessity of such products to the use of submarines, aeroplanes,
and motors, the United States Government has not yet reached the
conclusion that they are improperly included in a list of contraband. Military operations to-day are largely a question of mot.ive
pow·er through mechanical devices. It is therefore difficult to argue
successfully against the inclusion of petroleum among the articles
of contraband .... "
"Great Britain and France have placed rubber on the absolute
contraband list 8nd leather on the conditional contraband list. Rubber is extensively used in the manufacture and operation of motors
and, like petrol, is regarded by some authorities as essential to motive po,ver to-day. Leather is even more vvidely used in cavalry and
infantry equipment. It is understood that both rubber and leather,
together with wool, have been embargoed by most of the belligerent
countries. It vvill be recalled that the United States has in the
past ex·ercised the right of embargo upon exports of any commodity
vvhich might aid the enemy's cause." (Secretary of State Bryan to

.

'
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Senator Stone, Jan. 20, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~
1914, Supplement, x.)
14. "I note your excellency's statement that in taking the measure
of placing resinous products and turpentine on the list of contraband,
His Brittannic Majesty's Government followed the usage of all
maritime nations, and notably that of the United States, when at
war, who have invariably clain1~ed and exercised the right of making
additions from time to time to their lists of contraband-a right
explicitly conferred in the Declaration of London.
"I do not for a moment suppose that by this statement your
excellency intends to advance the principle that helligerents have
the right to add at their pleasure to the list of contraband without
reference to the character of the article in vel v~ed, for in that case
I would be compelled to question the principle." -(Secretary of State
Bryan to the British Ambassador to the United States, SpringRice, January 13, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 1915,
Supplement~

306-7.)

15. The spirit of retaliation between the belligerents which made
all neutral protests futile is illustrated by the German War Zone
proclamation of February 4, 1915, which stated that the waters
surrounding Great Britain and Ireland were to be considered as
"within the seat of vvar and that all enemy merchant vessels found
in those waters after the eighteenth instant will be destroyed although it may not always be possible to save crews and passengers.
,. "Neutral vessels expose themselves to danger within this zone
of war since in view of the misuse of the neutral flag ordered by
the British Government on January thirty-first and of the contingencies of maritime 'varfare it cannot always he avoided that
neutr~l vessels suffer from attacks intended to strike enemy ships."
(United States Foreign Relations~ 1915, Supplement~ 94. United
States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933, 17.)
16. "Unofficial critics praise the courtesy and admit the propriety
of our communications, but they regard them as remote and impracticable. They point out that we have not carried our points:
namely, that copper should not be contraband, that ships should be
searched at sea, that to-order cargoes should be valid, that our
export trade had fallen off because of the war. They point out these
in good-natured criticism as evidence of the American love of protest for political effect at home. While the official reception of our
communications is dignified, the unofficial and general attitude to
them is a smile at our love of letter writing as at Fourth of July
orations. ,_fhey quietly laugh at our effort to regulate sea warfare
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under ne\v conditions by \vhat they regard as lawyers' disquisitions
out of textbooks. 'They [receive J thetn \vith courtesy, pay no further attention to them, proceed to settle our shipping disputes ·with
an effort at generosity and quadruple their orders from us of war
materials. T'hey care nothing for our definitions or general protests
but are \villing to do us every practical favor and \vill under no
conditions either take our advice or offend us. T'hey regard our
\vri tings as addressed either to con1plaining shippers or to politicians
at home.
"For these reasons complaints about concrete cases as they arise
are tnore effective than general comtnunications about rules of
sea \Varfare, \vhich must be revised by the submarine, the aeroplane,
the mine and our own precedents." ('felegrams from the American
ambassador in Great Britain to the Secretary of State, May 21,
1915. United States }'oreign Relations~ 1915, Supplement~ 147.
United States Naval War College, International Law Situations~

1933, 17-18.)
17. "The most difficult questions in connection with conditional
contraband arise with reference to the shipment of foodstuffs. No
country has maintained mor·e stoutly than Great Britain in modern
times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from interference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. The
circumstances of the present struggle are causing His Majesty's
Government some anxiety as to \vhether the existing rules with
regard to conditional contraband, framed as they were with the
object of protecting so far as possible the supplies which \Vere intended for the civil population are effective for the purpose, or
suitable to the conditions present. T_!Ie principle which I have
indicated above is one \vhich His Majesty's Government have
constantly had to uphold against the opposition of contintental
powers. In the absence of some certainty that the rule would be
respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great doubt
whether it should be regarded as an established principle of international law.... "
"The reason for dra\ving a distinction het\veen foodstuffs intended for the civil population and those for the armed forces or
enemy Government disappears when the distinction bet\veen the
civil population and the armed forces itself ,disappears.
"In any country in which there exists such tremendous organization for war as now obtains in Germany there is no clear diversion
'
[division] bet\veen
those whom the Govern~ent is responsible for
feeding and those whom it is not. Experience sho,vs that the power
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to requisition will be used to the fullest extent in order to make
sure that the wants of the military are supplied, and however much
goods may be imported for civil use it is by the military that they
will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now
that the German Government have taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country. (Note from the British Foreign Secretary to
the American Ambassador, Feb. 12, 1915. United States Foreign
Relations_, 1915, Supplement_, 332. United States Naval War College, International Law Situations_, 1933, 18-19.)
"In Department's consideration of destinatibn of conditional
contraband, it is necessary to ascertain to "\vhat extent the military
authorities have superseded civil authorities in the Government of
Germany so far as control over imports are concerned, and to what
extent the Government controls the use of .articles on contraband
list of Great Britain and her allies. Are private consignees free to
import such articles without interference by authorities?" (An inquiry by the United States Department of State in regard to the
control of German resources and imports by the German Government, October 28, 1915.. United States Foreifln Relations_, 1915,
Supplement_, 603. United States Naval War College, International
Law Situations_, 1933, 19.)

19. "Following information communicated verbally by [German] Foreign Office; "\vritten answer promised:
" ( 1) Owing to proclamation issued at outbr,eak of war, military authorities theoretically have power to supersede civil authorities, but, practically, power has been exercised in only few instances
and not at all in connection with customs authorities.
" ( 2) In so far as control of use of imported goods is concerned,
Government regards enemy's list of conditional contraband as of
no importance.
" ( 3) Receipt and distribution of certain imported food and
fodder products may take place only through central organization
which distributes to civil parties only, but military authorities have
power to requisition against paym·ent anything needed by army
or navy.
" ( 4) Chancellor has power to grant exemption from control and
distribution and military authorities have power to guarantee in
advance freedom froin requisition of de~ignated imported consignments in whole or part." ( R,eply to the United States Department
of State by the American Embassy in Berlin, December 4, 1915.
United States Foreign Relations_, 1915, Supplement_, 622. United
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States Naval War College, International Law Situations~ 1933,

19-20.)
20. " .. . The circumstances of the present war are so peculiar
that His Majesty's Government consider that for practical purposes the distinction between the two classes of contraband has
ceased to have any value. So large a proportion of the inhabitants
of the enemy country are taking part, directly or indirectly, in th e
vvar that no real distinction can novv be drawn between the armed
forces and the civilian population. Similarly, the enemy Governrrlent has taken control, by a series of decrees and orders, of practically all the articles in the list of conditional contraband, so that
they are novv available for Government use. So long as these
exceptional conditions continue our belligerent rights with r·espect
to the two kinds of contraband are the same, and our treatment of
them must be identical." (Explanation of the British Government
after notification of a revised contraband list. Vice Consul in London to Secretary of State Lansing, April 20, 1916 (enclosure).
United States Foreign RelationsJ 1916, Supplement~ 385.)
21. "Sir: With refer~ ence to the announcem·e nt made by the
British Foreign Office, under date of April 13, 1916, of the intention of the British Government to treat alike absolute and conditional contraband, you are instructed to communicate to the Foreign
Office '! formal r·e servation, in regard to this announcement, in the
sense that, in view of the established practice of a number of
maritimr. nations, including Great Britain and the United States,
of distinguishing between absolute and conditional contraband, the
GovernnH~nt of the United States is impe1led to notify the British
Government of the reservation of all rjghts of the U riited States
or its citizens in respect of any American interests which may be
adversely affected by the abolition of the distinction between these
two classes of contraband, or by the illegal extension of the contn:~
band lists during the present vv-ar by Great Britain and her allies."
(Instructions from Secretary of State Lansing to Ambassador Page
in Great Britain, Nov. 11, 1916. United States Foreign Relations~ 1916, Supplement p 483. United States Naval ·war College,
International Law Situations~ 1933, 20.)
22. "In modern times the two chief points of controversy have
related to the carriage of contraband and the trading through blockaded ports." " ... I only wish to note and ·extract the principle upon
'vhich they are based. Broadly, the principle is that the maritime
commerce of neutrals is subject to restriction by the acts of States
at war, if that commerce tends to assist an enemy either directly in
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his warlike operations, or indirectly in the carrying on of his own
trade upon which his power of continuing the war may largely, or
even entirely, depend. 1""'he object, and the enemy's commerce. The
result, and the inevitable result, to neutrals is interference with
their trade."
"In 'the application of the principle, the boundary of the law of
nations has been extended from time to time to adapt itself to new
and ever-changing conditions. This law must from its nature have
room for expansion. It cannot and never could be squeezed into
a mould of a particular siz,e or shape. It never had or could have
the quality of immutability attributed to the laws of the Medes
and Persians. It could not be confined within artificial limits like
an Act of Parliament. It has the essence and qualities of a living
organism' like the common law· of this realm."
"In the two branches already mentioned, namely, contraband and
blockade, this natural development is clearly illustrated. Contraband goods were at one time comprised within a very limited
catalogue. At the present day, the list is extensively enlarged. The .
result to neutrals has been that their trade in such goods has to
run greater and increasing risks and penalties. Moreover, in recent
times not only have the contraband goods themselves been subject
to confiscation, but the neutral vessels which carry them have also
been rendered confiscable in many cases. It has become established
law, too, that other goods on the same vessel belonging to the ,
same neutral character or enemy destination. It may be added, also,
that the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to contraband trade has greatly ~encroached upon and fettered the trade
of neutrals in time of war. This doctrine was originated in connection with the so-called .'Rule of 17 56,' but since its extension
to trade in contraband goods by the Courts of North American
States at the time of the Civil War it has hecome established as
part of the law of nations." (Sir Samuel Evans, February 16, 1917,
supporting the Retaliatory Order in Council in The Leonora and
0 ther Vessels ( 1918), a British case. VII Ll oyds Prize Cases~
262, 300.

23. The United States Naval Instructions of 1917
retained, in name if not in reality, the distinction
between absolute and conditional contraband even
though it was out of step with the practice of the time.
23. "In the absenoe of notice of change which the Government
of the United States may make at the outbreak of or during war, the
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follo\ving classification and enumeration of contraband \vill govern
commanders of ships of war."
24. 'vfhe articles and materials mentioned in the followin g paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), actually destined to terri tory belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to armed forces of the enemy,
and the articles and materials mentioned in the follovving paragraph (e) actually destined for the use of the enemy Government
or its armed forces, are, unless exempted by treaty, regarded as
contraband."
"( ~ a) All kinds of arms, guns, ammunition, explosives, and
machines for their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof;
materials or ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for their use."
"(b) All contrivances for or means of transportation on land,
in the wat~er or air, and machines used in their manufactu re or
repair; component parts thereof; materials or ingredients used 1n
their manufacture; instruments, articles or animals necessary or
convenient for their use."
" (c) All n1eans of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, m achines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile
operations."
" (d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also metal,
'materials, dies, plates, machinery or other articles necessary or
convenient for their manufacture."
" (e) All kinds of fuel, food, foodstuffs, feed, forag·e, and clothing and articles and materials used in their manufacture."
25. "Articles and materials even though enumerated in
paragraph 24, if exempted, by special tr·eaty provisions, are not
regarded as contraband."
59. "The neutral or enemy character of merchandise found on
board an enemy private vessel is determined by the neutral or
enemy cmnmercial domicile of the owner, whether the owner be an
individual, a firm, or a corporation. In the abs·ence of proof of
the neutral character of goods found on board an enemy vessel,
they are presumed to be enemy goods."
67. "The neutral flag covers enemy goods vvith the ·exception
of contraband of vvar." (Declaration of Paris, 1856, art. 2.)
68. "Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war,
are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag." (Declaration of
Paris, 1856, art. 3.)
69. "Contraband, in paragraph 24 (a), (b), (c), and (d), is
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liable to capture if its actual destination is the territory belonging
to or occupied by the enen1y, or the armed forces of the enemy. It
is immaterial whether the carriage of the contraband to such actual
destination be direct in the original vessel or involve trans-shipment
or transport overland."
70. "Contraband, in paragraph 24 (e), is liable to capture if
it is actually destined for the use of the enemy government or its
armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contraband
be direct in the original vessel, or involves trans-shipment or
transport overland."
71. "A destination for the use of the enemy government or its
anned forces re£,erred to in paragraph 70 is presurned to exist if the
contraband is consigned"(a) ri'o enemy authorities.
" (b) To a part of equipment or supply of the armed forces of
the enemy or other place serving as a. base for such armed forces.
" (c) To a contractor or agent in enemy territory who, by common knowledge, supplies articles of the kind 1n question to the
enemy authorities·}'
72. "A destination to territory belonging to or occupied by the
enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy, referred to in paragraph
69, is presumed to exist if the contraband is consigned 'to order/
'to order or assigns,' or with an unnamed consignee, but in any
case going to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to
neutral territory in the vicinity thereof." (Instructions for the
Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare_, June,

1917, 15, 24, 27-28.)
24. "When Great Britain inquired in April of 1918 whether the
United States would concur in the addition to the British list of
absolute contraband of ( 1) willo·ws and osiers; (2) sodium fluoride; ~
( 3) tin waste; ( 4) tin and lead and their alloys, salts, compounds,
and ores; and ( 5) wire steel and iron, the: Navy Department, to
which the inquiry was referred, replied that the American contraband list already was broad enough to embrace these items, since
willows and osiers could be used in the manufacture of aircraft
parts, sodium fluoride was involved in the production of aluminum
vvhich was used in the manufacture of aircraft and of n1unitions,
and the remaining items were all 'employed or capable of being
employed' in the manufacture of munitions. The British Ambassador was inform,ed that these items were included in the list issued
'
by the United States in June 1917. When the British Government
later inquired concerning the addition of citric acid and citrates
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to the list of British absolute contraband, the State Department
replied that these products were regarded as included within the
Arnerican contraband list of June 1917, since citric acid was the
active principle of lime juice, which was included in the naval
ration of some governments, and since citrates were drugs or medicines useful to the armed forces as well as to the general population." (The A:cting Secretary of State Phillips to the Secretary of
the Navy Daniels, June 4, 1918; Daniel!' to Secretary of State
Lansing, June 18, 191 8; Acting Secretary of State Polk to the
British Ambassador on Special l\1ission Reading, July .1 0 and July
18, 1918. Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International
Law~ VII, 23-4. United States Foreign Relations~ 1918, Supplement~ vol. II, 917-22.)
25. "Immediately on the outbreak of vvar an Examination Service was established at Kirkwall, the Downs, Port Said, and Gibraltar, and the North Sea between the Orkneys and N onvay was
patrolled. Merchant vessels were brought into port and examined
there, for boarding and search at sea were rendered dangerous by
submarines, and officers afloat could not be kept adequately informed of the intricate developments in policy. The Examining
Officers in the ports acted under direct, and constantly more
stringent, orders from London as to the v~ essels and cargoes which
they were to seize or release. In London the work of translating
the developing policy into detailed rules and orders wer~e undertaken
by a Contraband Committee representing the Admiralty and the
Foreign Office."
"Naval seizure and search was, ho,vever, only one, and in time
perhaps not the most important instrument, of the blockade.
Throughout the war the Foreign Office \iVere supplementing it by
elaborate and very effective agreements with neutral countries, by
\vhich, in return for permission to import themselves, they undertook to control export to Germany. There was throughout competitive pressure on the contiguous northern neutrals by Germany,
\vho could threaten to invade them, and by the Allies who could
withhold many vital supplies. In this competition the balance
inclined gradually on the side of the Allies, and the Allied
agreements .became more and more complete. It was nearly a year,
however, before the blockade became really effective. In the early
months supplies of all kinds, except finished munitions, flowed
abundantly into Germany. l\1erchants had learnt how to send
'conditional contraband' through the contiguous neutrals. The
diplomatic position, both with these neutrals and America, \iVas
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making more drastic action difficult; but it was evident that without it the blockade might almost as well be abandoned."
"Germany's declaration, however, that after February 1915 she
would instruct her submarines to attack all merchant vessels in
British waters, created an outburst of indignation in neutral countries, vvhich Great Britain at once used to make the blockade
comprehensive. In the Reprisals Order of March 11, 1915, she
announced her intention to stop all goods of enemy origin or
destination, and proceeded henceforth to stop supplies intended for
Germany, without regard to the destination of the earlier contraband rules or to the fact that the supplies might be consigned
~uough a neutral port. Even this, however, was not enough. It wa.'"
usel~ ess to prohibit every cargo of food destined for Germany,
':vhether sent through contiguous neutral countries or not, if these
neutral countries could themselves import freely for their o'vn
uses, and with the sufficiency so obtained, ·export their own produce
to Germany by routes which the Allies could not control. This
was the reason for the 'rationing' policy, ,vhich was begun in 1915,
and subsequently became the central feature in the whole blockade
system. D,etailed statistics were compiled as to the pre-war imports
and consumption of all the neutral countries which _had uncontrolled acc~ess to Germany; and only enough war imports were
allowed to give a bare sufficiency for internal consumption. The
neutral countries were therefore compelled to adopt internal rationing measures, so that the system of official control extended over
almost the whole worl~-neutral and belligerent alike." (Salter,
]. A., Allied Shipping ControlJ (Oxford, 1921), 99-100. Sir
Arthur Slater was Secretary to the Allied Maritime Transoort
Council and Chairman of the Allied Mari tim~e Transport Executive during World "\Var I.)
26. "As was sh9wn in the World War, it is difficult and at
times impossible to distinguish between absolute and conditional
contraband. By nature, some goods may equally serve the combatant
and noncombatant population. If a consignment of goods is unquestionably for the civil population in a given ar,ea, these goods may
in fact make it possible to send to the forces other goods ·which
would 'have been essential in that area without the consignment and
it has been held that it thus makes little difference which goods go
to the forces as the result is the same. The means of transportation
and methods of warfare have so far changed that nearly all parts
of a state may serve its forces and nearly all goods may be of use for
the forces. Indeed in the World War German courts seemed to
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regard all ports of England as po rts which could be considered
bases and the British seemed to regard practically all goods as of
military use.
"The distinctions between absolute and conditional contraband
came to have little significa nce and to be little applied in practice.
During the World War most sta tes participating in the conflict
formally abolished or tacitly disregard the distinction."
"Contraband consists of articles which a neutral may not furnish
to one belligerent \vithout risk of capture by the other belligerent.
rfhe essential items for consideration would be the nature of the
article and the destination.
"Goods of the nature of contraband of which capture might be
j ustified would be such as would aid the belligerent in the conduct
of the war. In early days when the conduct of the ·war depended
almost wholly upon supplying the enrolled armed forces with the
·simple implements of war, lists v1ere comparatively easy to draw
up and did not vary greatly from year to year. Pitch-balls and
javdins might be included in a contraband list, as in the treaties
with Sweden, 1783, and some other early treaties of the United
States, but cotton and oil and many other articles \Vere definitely
excluded from the list, and it was provided they 'shall not by any
pretended interpretation be comprehended among prohibited or con~
traband goods' unless bound to places 'besieged, blocked, or invested'
so as to be 'nearly surrounded by one of the belligerent po,vers.' "
"The intention of such agreements was to confine the list of contraband to such articles as were actually for 1var use. Manifestly
therefore for all contraband articles the destination was a matter of
equal importance \Vith the nature of the article itself, for if the
article whatever its nature, was not destined for vvar use it would
not be liable as contraband. Speaking of articles of ordinary use
such as provisions, Mr. Justice Stor.y in the case of the Commercen_,
1816, said, "if destined for the army: or navy of the enemy, or for his
ports of naval or military equipment, they are deemed contraband.'
(1 Wheat. 387.)"
"The attitude of leading states has varied in r,e gard to what articles and when articles might be treated as conditional contraband.
Even during the World War there \Vere many conflicting opinions."
"If a state mobilizes its whole population and all its resources
for war, ~ evidently it will be difficult if not impossible to distinguish
among consignments destined for that state, and anything bound for
the state, unless exempted on humanitarian grounds, m ay be liable
to capture as contraband. The grounds of humanity vvould exempt
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articles whose sole use would be for medicinal and surgical purposes
and articles nece3sary for Red Cross operations."
"The changing use and impossibility of determining \Vhat may
be of use in war from day to day and the possibility of mobilization
of population would therefore justify the declaration that the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband is abolished."
"All goods other than those solely for humanitarian and Red
Cross use might be declared contraband." (United Stat·es Naval
War College, I nternationa[ Law Situations., 1933, 25-8.)

Continuous V uyage and Contraband.
The problem of determining destination in it?elf,
of goods increased in importance as the distinction .
between absolute and conditional contraband diminished and the contraband list grew longer, for
in total warfare goods consigned to a neutral country
but with an e"'n emy country as the ultimate or probably ultimate destination could not be tolerated by
any belligerent. As a result of these trends, the doctrine of continuous voyage, previously applicable to
only a share of the goods, now became applicable to
most goods, all contraband.
1

1. " ( 5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said
declaration [of London], conditional contraband, if sho\vn to have
the destination referred to in Articl·e 33, is liable to capture, to
whatever port the vessel is bound and at \vhatever port the cargo
is to be discharged." (British Order in Council, Aug. 20, 1914.
United States Foreign Relations, 1914, Supplement 220).
2. For French ·and Russian decrees corresponding to the British
Order in Council, see United States Foreign Relations., 1914, Supplement., 222, or the A m.erican 1 ournal of International Law., Vol.
9, Special Supplement., (July 1915) 31-3.
3. " ... it is manifest that this article nullifies the \Vords 'and
when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port'
which appear in Article 35 of the Declaration of London. This then
is a reversion to the doctrine of continuous voyage in the tnatter
of conditional contraband, which was abandoned by the London
conference according to the official report of the drafting committee."
"'rhis Government, therefore, feels compelled to state that
Articles 3 and 5 of the Order in Council are inadmissible in them-
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sel vcs, and that the purpose for which they have apparently been
devised, as explai ned by the tn ctnorand urn of the Foreign Office,
namely, to 'intercept neutral cmnmerce on its way to a neutral nation, is, in the opinion of this Governtnent, equally inadmissible."
(Acting Secretary of State Lansing to Ambassador Page, Sept. 26,
1914. Unit ed States Foreign Relations,~ 1914, Supplement,~ 229-

230).
4. "1. During the present hostilities the provisions of the conven tion kno\vn as th e Declaration of London shall, subject to the
exclusion of the lists of contraband and non-contraband, and to the
modifications hereinafter set out, be adopted and put in force by His
Majesty's Government.
''The modifications are as follows :
" ( i) A neutral vessel, with papers indicating a neutral destination, \Vhich, notwithstanding the destination shown
on the papers, proceeds to an enemy port, shall be liable
to capture and condemnation if she is encountered before
the end of her next voyage."
" (iii) N ot\vithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the
said declaration, conditional contraband shall be liable
to capture on board a vessel bound for a neutral port
if the goods are consigned 'to order,' or if the ship's
papers do not show who is the consignee of the goods,
or if they sho\v a consignee of the goods in terri tory
belonging to or occupied by the enemy."
" ( iv) In the cases covered by the preceding paragraph (iii)
it shall lie upon the o\vners of the goods to prove that
their destination was innocent."
"2. Where it is shown to the satisfaction of one of His Majesty's
Principal Secretaries of State that the enemy Government is drawing supplies for its armed forces from or through a neutral country,
he may direct that in respect of ships bound for a port in that country, Article 35 of the said Declaration shall not apply. Such direction shall be notified in the London Gazette and shall operate until
the same is withdrawn. So long as such direction is in force, a vessel
\Vhich is carrying conditional contraband to a port in that country
shall not be immune from capture." (British Order in Council,
Oct. 29, 1914. (Enclosure in a dispatch from Ambassador Page
to Secretary of State Bryan, Nov. 3, 1914. United States Foreign
Relations,~ 1914, Supplement,~ 262-3.)

5. For French and Russian regulations similar to
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the British decree of October 29, 1914, see the American ] ournal of International Law, Vol. 9, Special
Supplenzent, 24, 26, 31, 35-36.
6. For a similar _German ordinance of April 18, ,
1915 justified as "in retaliation of the regulations
adopted by England and her allies, deviating from the
London declaration," see the American Journal of
International Lau', Vol. 9, Special Supplement, 45-6.
"The United States has made earnest representations to Great
Britain in regard to the seizure and detention by the British authorities of all American ships or cargoes bona fide destined to neutral
ports on the ground that such seizures and detentions were contrary
to the existing rules of international law. It will be recalled, however,
that American ~Qurts have established various rules bearing on the
matters.' The rule of 'continuous voyage' has been not only asserted
by American tribunals but extended by them. They have exercised
the right to determine from the circumstances whether the ostensible was the real destination. They have held that the shipment of
articles of contraband to a neutral port 'to order,' from which, as
a matter of fact, caroges had been transhipped to the enemy, is
corroborative evidence that the cargo is really destined to the enemy
instead of to the neutral port of delivery. It is thus seen that some
of the doctrines which appear to bear harshly upon neutrals at the
present time ar,e analogous to or outgrowths from policies adopted
by the United States when it was a belligerent. The Government
therefore cannot consistently protest against the application of rules
which it has follow,ed in the past, unless they have not been practiced as heretofore." (Secretary of State Bryan to Senator Stone,
January 20, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement~ ix.)
8. "No one in these days will dispute the g-eneral proposition
that a belligerent is entitled to capture contraband goods on their
way to the enemy; that right has now become consecrated by long
usage and g'e neral acquiescence. Though the right is ancient, the
means of exercising it alter and develop with the changes in the
methods and machinery of commerce. A century ago the difficulties
of land transport rendered it impracticable for the belligerent to
obtain supplies of sea-borne goods through a neighboring neutral
country. Consequently the belligerent actions of his opponents neither required nor justified any iiHerference with shipments on their
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·w ay to a neutral port. 'l'his principle \vas recognized and acted
· on in th e decisio ns in vvhich Lord Sto\vell laid do\vn the lines on
\vhich captures of such goods should be dealt \vith.
"'The advent of steam power has rendered it as easy for a belligerent to supply himself through the ports of a neutral contiguous
country as through his own, and has therefore rend ered it impossi ble for his opponent to refrain from interfering with commerce
intended for the enemy merely because it is on its way to a neutral
port.
"No better instance of the necessity of countering new devices
for despatching contraband goods to an enetny by new methods of
applying the fundamental principle of the right to capture contraband can be given than the steps \vhich the Government of the
United States found it necessary to take during the American
Civil War. It was at that time that the doctrine of continuous voyage was first applie~ to the capture of contraband, that is to say,
it \Vas then for the first time that the belligerent found himself
obliged to capture contraband goods on their \Vay to the enemy, even
though at the time of capture they wer,e en route for a neutral port
from which they were intended subsequently to continue their
journey. The policy then followed by the Government of the United
States was not inconsistent \Vith general principles already sanctioned by international law, and met with . no protest from His Majesty's Government, though it was upon British cargoes and upon
British ships that the losses and the inconvenience due to this new
development of the application of the old rule of international la\v
principally fell. The criticisms which have been directed against
the steps then taken by the United Stat,es came, and come, from
those who sa\v in the methods employed in Napoleonic times for the
prevention of contraband a limitation upon the right itself, and
failed to S'f~e that in Napoleonic times goods on their way to a
neutral port were imQlune from capture, not because the immediate
destination. conferred a privilege, but because capture under such
.
circumstances
were unnecessary. "
"The most difficult questions in connection \vith conditional
contraband arise with reference to the shiprp.ent of foodstuffs. No
country has maintained more s~outly than Great Britain in modern
times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from interference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. The
circumstances of the present struggle are causing His Majesty's
Government some anxiety as to whether the existing rules with
regard to conditional contraband, named as they were \Vith the
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object of protecting so far as possible the supplies \vhich \Vere
intended for the civil population are effective for the purpose, or
suitable to the conditions present. The principle ·which I have indicated above is one \vhich His l\1ajesty's Government have
constantly had to uphold against the opposition of continental
powers. In the absence of some certainty that the rule \vould be
respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel great doubt
whether it should be regarded as an established principle of internationalla\v." (British Foreign Office note of February 10, 1915.
United States Foreign Relations, 1915, Supplement, 324, 327-8,

332.)
9. "In October and November 1914 the Kim, the A !fred Nobel,
the Bjornsterjne Bjornson, and the Fridland, all N on¥egian ships
except the Fridland, which \Vas s,vedish, ssiled from Ne\v york for
Copenhagen. In their cargoes \Vere foodstuffs, rubber, and hides."
"In these cases inference as to ultimate destination to Germany
of goods consigned to Copenhagen \Vas based in the first instance
upon the rapid increase in the relative amount of such goods shipped
to Copenhagen in corresponding months of 1913 and 1914. There
was also an argument on the ground of evident deception and
misinformation." (United States Naval War College, International Law Situations, 1933, 20-21.)
10. Sir Samuel Evans in holding the cargoes of the Kim and the
three other ships liable to condemnation as contraband declared:
"T,vo important doctrines familiar to international la\v come
prominently forward for consideration: the one is embodied in the
rule as to 'continuous voyage,' or continuous 'transportation'; the
other relates to the ultimate hostile destination of conditional and
absolute contraband respectively.
"The doctrine of 'continuous voyage' was first applied by the
English Prize Courts to unla\\rful trading. There is no reported
case in our Courts where the doctrine is applied in terms to the
carriage of contraband; but it \Vas so applied and extended by the
United States Courts against this country in the time of the American Civil War; and its application \Vas acceded to by the British
Government of the day; and was, moreover, acted upon by the
International Commission which sat under the Treaty bet\veen
this country and America, made at Washington on l\1ay 8, 1871,
when the commission, composed of an Italian, an American , and
a British delegate, unanimously disallo,ved the claims in The Peterhoff, \vhich was the leading case upon the subject of continuous
transportation in relation to contraband goods. . . . "

I
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"1 axn not going through the history of it, but the doctrine w as
asserted by Lord Sa lisbury at the time of the South African war
with reference to Germa n vessels carrying goods to Dclagoa Bay,
and as he \Vas dealing ·wi th Gcnnany, he fortified hi1nsclf by referring to the vic\v of Bluntschli as the true vievv as follows : 'lf the
ships or goods arc sent to the destination of a neutral port only
the better to come to the aid of the enemy there \vill be contraband
of \var, and confiscation will be justified.' "
• "1 t is essential to appreciate that th e founda tion of the lavv of
contraband, and the reason for the doctrine of continuous voyage
,vhich has been grafted into it, is the right of a belligerent to
prevent certain goods frotn reaching the country of the enemy for
his tnilitary use."
"A compromise \vas attempted by the London Conference in
the unratified Declaration of London. rfhe doctrine of continuous
voyage or continuous transportation was conceded to the full by
the conference in the case of absolut,e contraband, and it \Vas
expressly declared that 'it is immaterial whether the carriage or
the goods is direct, or entails transshipment, or a subsequent transport by land.
"As to conditional contraband, the attempted compromise vvas
that the doctrine vvas excluded in the case of conditional contraband except where the enemy country had no seaboard. As is usual
in compromises, there seems to be an absence of logical reason for
the exclusion. If it is right that a belligerent should be permitted
to capture absolute contraband proceeding by various voyages or
transport with an ultimate destination for the enemy territory, why
should he not be allowed to capture goods \vhich, though not absolutely contraband, become contraband by reason of a further
destination to the enemy Government or its armed forces? And
vvith the facilities of transportation by sea and by land vvhich now
exist the right of a belligerent to capture conditional contraband
would be of a very shado~vy value if a mere consignment to a
neutral port were sufficient to protect the goods. It appears also
to be obvious that in these days of easy transit, if .the doctrine of
continuous voyage or continuous transportation is to hold at all, it
must cover not only voyages from port to port at sea, but also
transport by land until the real, as distinguished from the merely
ostensible, destination of the goods is reached."
"I have no hesitation in pronouncing that, in my vievv, the doctrine of continuous voyage, or transportation, both in relation to
carr.iage by sea and to carriage over land, had become part of the

48
law of nations at the commencement of the present vvar, in .accordance with the principles of recognized legal decisions, and vvith the
view of the great body of modern jurists, and also with the practice
of nations in recent maritime warfare.
"The result is that the Court is not restricted in its vision to
the primary consignments of the goods in these cases to the neutral
port of Copenhagen; but is entitled, and bound, to take a more
extended outlook in order to ascertain whether this neutral destination was merely ostensible and, if so, wha~ the real ultimate
destination vvas." (The KimJ· The Alfred N obelJ· T:he Bjornsterjne
BjornsonJ· The Fridland ( 1915). III LloydJs Prize Cases 167,

355-359.)

11. In deciding that the goods were ultimately
destined for enemy territory, Sir Satnuel Evans,
stated:
"As to the real destination of a cargo, one of the chief tests is
whether it was consigned to the neutral port to be there delivered
for the purpose of being imported into the common stock of the
country."
". . . I have no hesitation in stating my conclusion that the
cargoes (other than the small portions acquired by persons in
Scandinavia whose claims are allowed) were not destined for consumption or us·e in Denmark or intended to be incorporated into
the general stock of that country by sale or otherwise; that Copenhagen was not the real bona fide place of delivery; but that the
cargoes were on their way at the tim·e of capture to German territory as their actual and real destination." (The KimJ· The Alfred
NobeL· The Bjornsterjne BjornsonJ· The Fridland. III LloydJs
Prize Cases) 167, 359, 362.)

12. "1. The provisions of the Declaration of London, Order in
Council No. 2, 1914, shall not be deemed to limit or to have
limited in any way the right of His Majesty, in accordance vvith
the la,v of nations, to capture goods upon the ground that they
are conditional contraband, nor to affect or to have affected the
liability of conditional contraband to capture, vvhether the carriage
of the goods to their destination be direct or entail transshipment
or a subsequent transport by land.
"2. rfhe provisions of Articl·e 1 ( ii) and (iii) of the said Order
in Council shall apply to absolute contraband as well as to conditional contraband.
"3. The destinations referred to in Article 30 and in Article 33
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of the said Declaration shall (in addition to any presumptions
laid do\vn in the ,said Order in Council) be presumed to exist, if
the goods are consigned to or for a person, \vho, during the present
hostilities, has fonvarded imported contraband goods to territory
belonging to or occupied by the enemy.
"4. In the cases covered by Articles 2 and 3 of this Order, it
shall lieu upon the o\vner of the goods to prove that their destination \Vas innocent." (British "Decla.ration of London Order in
Council, 1916," March 30, 1916. United States Foreign Relations_,
1916, Supplement_, 361.)

13. In regard to the meaning of Article 1 of the
above Order in Council, see The Kronprinsessan
JJ1 argareta, ( 1921), VIII Lloyd's Prize Cases, 241,
267-9. Also Briggs, H. W., Doctrine of Continuous
Voyage, (1926), 111-112.
14. " (a) The hostile destination required for the condemnation of contraband articles shall be presumed to exist, until the
contrary is sho\vn, if the goods are consigned to or for an enemy
authority, or an agent of the enemy State, or to or for a person in a
territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to or for a
person who, during the present hostilities, has for\varded contraband goods to an enemy authority, or an agent of the enemy State,
or to or for a person in territory belonging to or occupied by the
enemy, or if the goods are consigned 'to order,' or if the ship's
papers do not show who is the real consignee of the goods.
"(b) The principle of continuous voyage or ultimate destination shall be applicable both in cases of contraband and of blockade."
(British order in Council of July 7, 1916. United States Foreign
Relations_, 1916, Supplernent, 413-4.)

14. The Departtnent of State through its Ambassador to Great Britain protested against this Order
in Council, stating that the rules asserted in this
Order in Council were in conflict \Vi th the law and
practice of nations in several instances and that the
United States reserved its rights. (Secretary Lansing
to the Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain, Laughlin,
Sept. 18, 1916. United States Foreign Relations, 1916,
Supplement, 446-7.)
,
15. ·In the case of The Balto, the British had seized
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leather on board this Norwegian vessel bound from
the United States to Sweden as contraband of war.
The owners claimed that the leather was destined for
use only in Sweden. The Crown "sought discovery
with respect to the books of the consignee-claimant
concerning its transactions in boots as well as 1n
leather.''
Sir San1uel Evans granted discovery and said:
"The objection for the claimant is that the leather cannot in any
circumstances be seized as prize, if it was intended to be manufactured into boots in Sweden, although the boots were to be sent
to the forces of the enemy."
"It is the claimant's contention, that contraband goods cannot
.
*
be seized on a continuous voyage, unless they wer~e on their way
to a final enemy destination in the same condition as they were
at the time .of seizure sound? As at present advised, I think it is
quite unsound."
"One of the tests applied [in the Kim case] was vvhether the
goods imported were intended to become part of the common
stock of the neutral country into which they were first brought.
In my view the notion that leather, imported to a neutral country
for the express purpose of being at once turned into boots for the
enemy forces, becomes incorporated in the common stock of the
neutral country, is illusory. Instances can be given and multiplied
which appear to reduce to an absurdity the argument that if work
is done in the neutral country upon goods which are intended ulti- mately for the enemy, that circumstance of necessity puts an end
to their contraband character, and prevents their being confiscable
according to the doctrine of continuous voyage."
"Suppose coffee beans and cocoa beans were imported into a
neutral country with the object of their being convert~ ed into coffee
or cocoa to be sent on to the enemy, would the fact that the
coffee beans were ground in to coffee, or the cocoa beans were
ground and mixed with sugar to make cocoa in the neutral country,
be enough to render those goods immune from capture, if they
would be capturable as coffee or cocoa foodstuffs when afloat?
. .. If a field gun was imported, would it be protected from seizure
because it would, in fact, be mounted upon its appropriate carriage
before being exported from a neutral country to the enemy's front?
"The Court could not give affirmative answers to such questions
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as these unless it cut itself adrift from the safe anchor of common
sense." (The Balta_, (1907). VI Lloycts Prize Cases_, 141, 147- 9.)
16. "69. Con traband, in paragraph 24 (a), (b), (c), and (d),
is liable to capture if its actual destination is the territory belonging
to or occupied by the enemy, or the armed forces of the enemy. It
is immaterial whether the carriage of the contraband to such actual
destination be direct in the original vessel or involve trans-shipment
or transport overland.

"70. Contraband, in paragraph 24 (e), is liable to capture if it
is actually destined for the use of the enemy governm·ent or its
armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contraband
be direct in the original vessel, or involv,es trans-shipment or
transport overland.
"71. A destination for the use of the enemy government or its
armed forces referred to in paragraph 70 is presumed to exist if
the contraband is consigned" (a) To enemy authorities.
" (b) To a part of equipment or supply of the armed forces of
the enemy or other place serving as a base for such armed forces.
" (c) To a contractor or agent in enemy territory who, by common knowledge, supplies articles of the kind in question to the
enemy authorities."

"72. A destination to territory belonging to or occupied by the
enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy, referred to in paragraph 69, is presumed to exist if the contraband is consigned 'to
order,' 'to order or assigns,' or with an unnam·ed consignee, but in
any case going to territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy,
or to neutral territory in the vicinity thereof." (United States
Naval Instructions, 1917. Instructions for the Navy of the United
States Governing Maritime Warfare_, June, 1917, 27-8.)
17. :'In modern times the two chief points of controversy have
related to the carriage of contraband and to trading through
blockaded ports." " ... I only wish to note and extract the principle
upon which they are based. Broadly, the principle is that the maritime commerce of neutrals is subject to restriction by the acts of
States at war, if that commerce tends to assist an enemy either
directly in his warlike operations, or indirectly in the ·carrying on
of his own trade upon which his power of continuing the war may
largely, or even entirely, depend. The object, and the enemy's commerce. The result, and the inevitable result, to neutrals is interference with their trade."
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"In the application o.f the principle, the boundary of the law of
nations has been extended from time to time to adapt itself to new
and ever-changing conditions. This law must from its nature have
room for expansion. It cannot and never could be squeezed into a
mould of a particular size or shape. It never had or could have
the quality of immutability attribl;lted to the laws of the Medes
and Persians. It could not be confined within artificial limits like
an Act of Parliament. It has the essence and qualities of a living
organism like the common law of this realm."
"In the two branches already mentioned, namely, contraband and
blockade, this natural development is clearly illustrated. Contraband goods were at one time comprised within a very limited catalogue. ~t the present day, the list is extensively enlarged. The
result to neutrals has been that their trade in such goods has to
run greater and increasing risks and penalties. Moreover, in recent
times not' only have the contraband goods themselves been subject
to confiscation, but the neutral vessels w·hich carry them have also
been rendered confiscable in many cases. It has become established
law, too, that other goods on the same vessel belonging to the
same neutral cha.racter or enemy destination. It may be added, also,
that the application of the doctrine of continuous-voyage to contraband trade has greatly encroached upon and fettered the trade
of neutrals in time of war. This doctrine wras originated in connection with the so-called 'Rule of 17 56,' but since its extension
to trade in contraband goods by the Courts of North American
States at the time of the Civil War it has become established as
part of the law of nations." (Sir Samuel Evans, February 16,
1917, supporting the Retaliatory Order in Council in The Leonora
and Other f/esseJ[s (1918). VII Lloyd~s Prize Cases~ 262, 300.)

18. On March 7, 1918, the German Supreme Prize
Court upheld the seizure of conditional contraband
bound from Rotterdam to Norway on board The
Norden as contraband of war. The court declared
that a presumption of enemy destination arising from
the fact that the shipment of conditional contraband
was consigned "to order" was not overcotne by the
fact that the goods were to be processed in a neutral
country. The court maintained that a further demonstration was required that the product 'vould not be
of use to the enemy. (Garner, J. W., Prize La'v
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During the Wor ld War ( 1927), 573.)
19. "1~he lists of contraband both absolute and conditional ha ve
va ried fron1 tiinc to time and according to circumstances. 'fhc
belligerent has usually stood for an extended list while the neutral
has desired a restr icted list . Destination has ahvays been a deciding
factor in determining contraband. T'his has been particularly irnportant in the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage. 1t
has been maintained that the ultimate destination is to the country
in ·which the goods arc actually to become 'a part of the cmnmon
stock.'
"lV1any of the questions relating to ultimate destination vvcrc
raised in the American Civil War. 'rhe party to whom the goods
may be consigned does not always prove the ultimate destination.
Goods often in time of peace are 'to order or assigns.' Even the
British Government in the American Civil War did not deny
that such consignments on British vessels might not be open to
suspicion 'which might be dispelled by the shippers.' Some\vhat
similar qu.estions might arise in shipments of goods to Lranch es or
agents or when no consignee is named." (United States Naval vVar
College, International L{[fU) Situations~ 1933, 20-1.)

By the end of World War I, the doctrine of continuous voyage tended to include a doctrine of substitution. For example, in the case of The Bonna
(1918) the British had seized a cargo of Swedishowned cocoanut oil (conditional contraband) on
board this Norwegian vessel. The cocoanut oil was
destined to Sweden to be used in the making of margarine for consumption in Sweden. The Crown
claimed that the cocoanut ·oil was liable to capture
on the ground that "to the knowledge of the manufacturer, the margarine was to be consumed in Svveden in substitution for Swedish butter which in turn
would be shipped to Germany." The B_ri.tish court
held, however, that the cocoanut oil was not liable to
condemnation as conditional contraband destined for
German military use. See The Bonna) ( 1918), VII
Lloyd}s Pr£ze Cases, 367, 376-8.
( 4) Destination-Conditional Contraband.
With or without the doctrine of continuous voyage,
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the question of destination was of vital importance
in the determination of conditional contraband. At
the beginning of \IV orld War I most nations agreed
that articles (as named in a list) which can be used
in vvar as well as in peace can be considered contraband of war only if destined to the army, navy, or
other department of the governtnent of one of the
belligerents or to a place held by military forces. As
the war continued not only the line bet\veen absolute
and conditional contraband tended to becon1e obscured but also the line betvveen government and
private enterprise, for World War I had developed
into a total \var. Consequently, by the end of the
conflict the fe\v goods remaining on the conditional
contraband list v;ere seized by the belligerents aboard
ships bound from one neutral country to another neutral country as being destined for the enemy government.
1. Conditional contraband "consists, generally speaking, of articles 'vhich are susceptible of use in 'var as 'veil as for purposes
of peace ... "
'~Articles of the character stated are considered contraband if
destined to the army, navy, or department of government of one
of the belligerents or to a place occupied and held by military forces;
if not so destined they are not contraband, as for example, \vhen
bound to an individual or private concern." (Department of State
circular, 1914. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement~ 274, 276.)
2. "Destination to enemy territory is not, and cannot properly
be, considered a good and sufficient ground for seizure of foodstuffs
or other conditional contraband, unless they are destined for the
use of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy
state." (Acting Secretary of State Lansing to the Ambassador to
Great Britain Page, Sept. 26, 1914. United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, Supplement~ 229.)
3. " ... the right of neutrals to ship foodstuffs and other conditional contraband to the territories of belligerents, 'vhen destined
and intended for use by the civilian population and not destined
or intended for ultimate delivery to a department of the belligerent
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government, or its armed forces, is \veil established. But shippers
proposing to send foodstuffs to Germany should consider the situation produced by reported recent decree of the German authorities,
\vhich, from the accounts of it received by the Department, appears
to establish a governmental control, if not to constitute expropriation, of the food supply in Germany. 'fhe British Government
have said that, in vie\v of this decree and its effect, they must regard
shipn1ents of foodstuffs to Germany as, in fact, destined for the
Germ an Governmen t. Wi th out at this t im e u ndertaking to determi ne the effect of the decree, th e text of wh ich we have not, the
Department feels that interested persons sould be advised that the
status of shi pments of provisions to G ermany is put in doubt by
reason of the decree ment ioned." (Secret ar y of St ate B ryan to the
Secret ary of the 'f reasury McAdoo, Feb . 3, 1915, in reply to an
inqui ry. U nited S tates Foreign R elation s_, 1915, S upplement_, 318,

31 9.)
4. Great Br itain and F rance in 19 15 informed the Department
of State " that on account of a German decree by which all foo dstuffs were taken over by the Government all such commodities
destined for Germany would be considered subject to capture. "
(Ambassador Page to Secretary of State Bryan, Jan. 27, 1915 an d
French Ambassador J usserand to Secretary of State Bryan, February 6, 1915. United States Foreign Relations_, 1915, Supplement_,

317, 322.)

5. "A N onvegian sailing vessel which left a British port before
the outbreak of \Var in 1914 with a cargo of coal for C hile w·as
forced by damage to deviate from the direct route to its destination. The cargo was seized by a German war vessel on suspicion
that it \Vas destined for English naval forces, but the vessel w as
allowed to go free because it could not be taken to port. Claims
were brought before the Hamburg Prize Court for the coal taken
and for the damage suffered by the ship. The court upheld the
capture, but the decision was reversed upon appeal to the Imperial
Supreme Prize Court, on the basis of article 35 of the Declaration
of London and the corresponding article 36 of the German Prize
Ordinance. It was stated that the coal was conditional cont raband,
that no proof \Vas furnished of its destination to the enemy armed
forces, and that full faith would be given to the ship's papers."
( The Helicon, (1916). Hackworth, G . H., Digest of Internat ional Law_, Vol. VII, 67.)
6. "The cargo consisted of 3,238 barrels of salted herrings, consigned from Haugesund to Lubeck. Lubeck is a German base of
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supply. It is also a port which has been used on a very extensive
scale since the war for the importation of goods from Scandinavia
into Germany. Moreover, orders have been made by the German
Federal Council regulating the import of salted herrings into the
German Empire, whereby they must all be delivered to the Central
Purchasing Company, Limited, of Berlin, a company acting under
the directions of the German Imperial Chancellor. ... " ~
"1--.here is no doubt of its contraband character, or of its destination for the enemy Government or its forces." (Sir Samuel Evans.
in The 1-lakan case~ (1916). V. Lloyd~s Prize Cases~ 161, 168-9,

188.)
7. "A French court condemned food shipped on a neutral Italian
steamer, The Sibilla~ as conditional contraband with a hostile destination. The steamer was sailing from Barcelona to Genoa, and the
food was apparently destined for Germany." (Hackworth, G. H.,
Digest of International Law~ Vol. VII, 70. For other similar
French cases see Garner, J. W., Prize Law During the World
War~ ( 1917), 555n.)
8. 70. "Contraband, in paragraph 24 (e), is liable to capture
if it is actually destined for the use of the enemy government or
its armed forces. It is immaterial whether the carriage of contraband be direct in the original vessel, or involves trans-shipment or
transport overland."·
71. "A destination for the use of the enemy government or its
armed forces referred to in paragraph 70 is presumed to exist if
the contraband is consigned" (a) To enemy authorities.
" (b) To a part of equipment or supply of the armed forces of
the enemy or other place serving as a base for such armed forces.
" (c) To a contractor or agent in enemy territory who, by common knowledge, supplies articles of the kind in question to the
enemy authorities." (Instructions for tlze Navy of tlze United
States Governing Maritime Warfare~ June, 1917, 27-8.)
9. "It is clear that the ultimate as opposed to the ostensible
destination of goods would seldom, if ever, appear on the ship's
papers or be within the knowledge of the master of crew. It would
have to be proved or inferred frorn other sources, and it could
hardly be contended that if the Crown were in possession of evidence obtained from such other sources from which an ultimate
destination in an enemy country could be inferred as reasonably
probably, the seizure of the goods would not be justified." (The
Baron Stjernblad~ (1918), VI Lloyd}s Prize Cases~ 89, 102.)

·I~
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10. The British seized and condemned a cargo of cocoa shipped
frmn N e\V York to Scandinavian consignees. 'I'he cargo \vas condemned as conditional contraband after it ·was demonstrated that
the stocks of cocoa in Germany \Vere controlled by the G erman
Government and that the goods had an ultimate German destination. Lord Sterndale held that the cocoa \vould be used for the
German military forces. (The Esrom., (1919). VIII Lloyd"'s Prize
Cases., 492.)
11. "If a distinction is made bet\veen absolute and conditional
contraband, the distinction benveen enemy country and enemy
forces becomes important. If an unfortified area becomes fortified,
its status changes as a place to \vhich goods may without liability
be shipped. If the population of an area which has been subject only
to the civil lavv is mobilized and put under military control ~ the
status of the population changes as a population to which goods may
\Vithout liability be shipped." (United States Naval War College,
I nte·rnational Law Situations_, 1933, 21-2.)

( 5) Destination-Further Refinements.
The question of destination is even more complicated than it appears on the surface. Before and
•
after the question of absolute or conditional contraband has been resolved by really establishing one
absolute list and the line between government and
private enterprise has been erased, there has still
been the difficulty of actually proving enemy destination from the ship's documents, for many deceptions
have been practiced by shippers to conceal enemy
destination. On the other hand belligerents, desirous
of preventing all goods of any value in an all-out war
effort from reaching the enemy, have resorted to
stringent methods such as the examination of trade
statistics in order to prove enemy destination, with
or without the intention of applying the doctrine of
continuous voyage.
1. Lord Parker gave an order for discovery in a
case concerning the condemnation of hides and tanning materials abroad a Swedish vessel bound from
South America for Sweden and said:
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"The goods having been shipped in a neutral vessel, and ostensibly destined for a neutral port, can only be contraband of war if,
on the princiJ?le of continuous voyage, and according they had a
further or ultimate destination in an enemy country. Intention is
rarely the subject of direct evidence. As a rule it has to be inferred
from surrounding circumstances, and every circumstance which
could, either alone or in c9nnection with other circumstances, give
rise to an inference as to the intention of the parties concerned in
a transaction both relates and is relevant to the question what
that intention really was." (The Consul Corfitzon~ ( 1917). VI
Lloyd~ s Prize Cases~ 268, 274.)

2. See above, No. 16 under Destination-Continuous Voyage and Contraband, for U. S. Naval Instructions, 1917.
(a) Exporter's intention unimportant.
1. "It is not sufficient for the appellants to establish that Enrique
Rubio was a Spanish fruit exporter, who had no intention of sending his goods either to any enemy government or to an enemy base
of supply. The voyage is not limited to that which a shipper of
goods sets in motion. Whether goods in any particular instance
are contraband, by application of the doctrine of continuous voyage,
is a question of fact. Under the terms of' the Order in Council the
appellants must discharge the burden of proving that the destination, if the voyage had not been interrupted, would have been
innocent. When an exporter ships goods under such conditions that
he does not retain control of their disposal after arrival at the port
of delivery, and the control, but for their interception and seizure,
would ha~e passed into the hands of some other persons, who had
the intention either to sell them to an enemy government or to
send them to an enemy base of supply, th-en the doctrine of continuous voyage becomes applicable, and the goods on capture are
liable to condemnation as contraband." (Lord Parmoor in the case
of TheN orne and Other Vessels~ ( 1921). IX Lloyd~s Prize Cases

402, 427.)

(b) Neutral port auction.
1. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
condemned a cargo of oranges shipped from Spain
to neutral dealers in the Nether lands for auction in
theN ether lands. Lord Parmoor, said:
" ... Their Lordships are unable to hold that the mere fact that
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the goods vvill be offered for sale by auction at the port of arrival
is in itself conclusive of the innocency of their destination. It would
appear to them to be too wide a generalization that vvhatever the
special conditions may be, the goods could never be condemned as
contraband if once it is established that they would be offered at
public auction in a neutral auction in a neutral market." (The
N orne and Oth er Vessels, ( 1921). IX Lloyd} s Prize Cases, 402,

4:31-2.)
( c) Concealment.
1. uy he Lyngenfjord, a N orwegian vessel, was bound from
New York to N orvvay, carrying according to its bill of lading and
manifest sacks of coffee. The sacks were seized and condemned
by the British when it was discovered that the sacks contained not
coffee but a mixture of coffee and rubber (rubber being absolute
contraband). No appearance or claim was made by the shippers.
Th~ British, of course, induced the German destination from the
fact of concealment." (The Lyngenfjord, (1916). VI Lloyd}s
Prize Cases, 115.)
(d) Sales agent.
1. "In the opinion of their Lordships it would be impossible to
say- that an ordinary agent for sale is a 'consignee of the goods'
within the Order in Council of October 29, 1914. Such an agent
would not have the real control of the destination of the goods. It
would be within the power of his principal to give instructions
from time to time." (The Urna, ( 1920). IX Lloyd's Prize Cases,
104, 116. See also The Kronprins Gustaf, (1919). IX Lloyd's
Prize Cases, 137.)

2. The British shipped a cargo of cocoa and coffee
(conditional contraband) shipped by an American
company on a Danish vessel for Copenhagen, consigned to the American company's agent in Copenhagen. The American company claimed that the
cargo was intended for consumption in Denmark. Sir
Arthur Channell, speaking for the Judicial Con1mittee of the Privy Council declared that there were
' grounds for the conden1nation of the cargo and said:
" ... In the present case there is no doubt that the burden of
that proof is thrown on the respondents, inasmuch as the consignee
named in the bills of lading is admitted to be an agent for sale
of the goods on behalf of the claimants, the consignors, and there-
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fore was not the real consignee under the Order in Council of
October 29, 1914, as interpreted in the Louisiana and other cases."
(The United States, (1921). X Lloyd~s Prize Cases~ 61, 65-66.)

(e) Enemy agent.
1. 1V1odification of the Declaration of London by
the British Order in Council of Oct. 29, 1914:
" ( ii) The destination referred to in Article 3 3 of the said declaration shall (in addition to the presumptions laid down in Article
34) be presumed to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an
agent of the enemy state." (United States Foreign Rell{l:tions., 1914,
Supplement~

258, 262.)

2. Sir Samuel Evans in condemning cattle feed on
board a Norwegian vessel traveling from Brazil to
Norway declared:
" ... These goods were sent nominally to people who are, according to the evidence before me, agents for the German Government
• and conduit pipes for the transmission of such goods as these to
Germany.... Upon the evidence before me, it would not be violent
presumption to say that these goods were on their way through
these agents to German territory for the use of the German forces.
Upon that ground also the goods, being conditional contraband,
are confiscable." (The Tysla~ ( 1916), V Lloyd~ s Prize Cases~ 433,
436. See also T.he Liv and Other Vessels~ (1917). VII Lloyd~s
Prize Cases~ 85.)

(f) Consignment uto Order.n
1. Before the announcement of the Order in Council of October 29, 1914, the British Foreign Office
sent a draft to the Department of State. In regard to
articles (iii) and (iv) of this Order in Council, the
British Foreign Office state:
"With regard to conditional contraband, Article 35 of the Declaration of London is left standing and will, therefore, exclude the
application of the doctrine of continuous voyage in respect of goods
consigned to a neutral firm at a neutral port. The right to seize
conditional contraband on a ship bound for a neutral port is maintained . . . in respect of cases ·where no consignee in the neutral
country is disclosed in the ship's papers. A great proportion of the
cargo shipped to Rotterdam is consigned merely 'to order' and may
be inrended for transit to the enemy country. In such cases, and

61
,vhere the goods are carried with a through bill of lading to the
enemy country, Article 35 would not apply." (United States Foreign Relations) 1914, SupplernentJ 246.)
"2. Department reiterates its position, as stated in the case of the
Kroonland respecting shipments 'to Order,' and holds that shipments of cc nsignrn ents to neutra l countries, though to shippers'
order, being in usual course and in accordance with established
custom of trade for protection of shipper against refusal of draft,
cannot rightfully be seized as contraband in absence of facts tending to sho,v that they are in fact destined for belligerents; and as
to the legality of the action of Great Brita.in in seizing American
shipments on neutral ships to neutral countries as in the above
cases on ground merely that shipments are consigned to order, the
Government of the United Stat~s enters an explicit denial." (Instruction from Secretary ·of State Bryan to Ambassador to Great
Britain Page, Dec. 3, 1914. United States Foreign Relations) 1914,
Supplement) 354.)
3. "Another circumstance which has been regarded as important
in determining the question of real or ostensible destination at the
neutral port was the consignment 'to order or assigns' without
. any consignee.
.
"
naming
"I am not unmindful of the argument that consignment 'to order'
is common in these days .... "
"The argument still remains good, that if shippers, after the
outbreak of war, consign goods of the nature of contraband to
their ovvn order without naming a consignee, it may be a circumstance of suspicion in considering the question whether the goods
, were really intended for the neutral country, or whether they had
another ultimate destination. Of course, it is not conclusive. The
suspicion arising from this form of consignment during vvar might
be dispelled by evidence produced by the shippers. It may be here
observed that some point was made that in many of the consignments the bills of lading were not made out 'to order' simpliciter, but to branches or agents of the shippers. That circumstance does not, in my opinion, make any material difference."
( 1,he Kim; The Alfred Nobel; The Bjornsterjne Bjornson; The
FridlandJ (1915). III Lloyd~s Prize Cases (167, 300-1.)
4. "The French Prize Council, in February 1915, said that in
the case of conditional contraband it was, as a matter of principle,
incumbent upon the captor to establish that the goods 'vere destined
for the use of the forces or government of the enemy but that
vvhen the consignment was 'to order' it did not possess the means
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of doing so and could not be required to do so. It stated that in
such a case there was justification for inquiring into any facts
serving to establish the true destination of the goods." (Comment
on the case of The Nieuw-A msterdam~ ( 1915), in Hack\vorth,
G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 73.)
5. "Shipments of honey and coffee (conditional contraband)
were sent from the West Indies before the war in 1914 on a Netherlands vessel consigned 'to order' at Hamburg. The vessel was seized,
and proceedings were brought to condemn the cargo as contraband. T'he French Prize Council held that condemnation \Vas not
justified, as there was no evidence that the consignees vvere intermediaries of the German state or of the German administration.
1-.he Council released the goods to the claitnants on condition that
they pay the freight to the ship-o,vner; it ordered the French Government to pay the ship-owner damages caused by the delay to the
vessel and interest on the freight." (Comment on the case of The
Ora:nje Nassau~ (1915), in Hackvvorth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 73.)
6. "In August 1915 the French Prize Council restored to the
owners a cargo of conditional contraband destined for Amsterdam
and consigned 'to order,' stating that the latter circumstance did
not constitute proof of ultimate destination to the armed forces or
government of the enemy." (Comment on the case of The Kambangan~ ( 1916), in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International
Law~ VII, 73.)
7. "A N onvegian vessel carrying ·a cargo of pyrites and fish from
Norway destined to Rotterdam was seized -by a German cruiser
and brought into port. The pyrites \vere consigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust or order. The Hamburg Prize Court condemned the vessel and its cargo, as pyrites vvere absolute contraband. The German Supreme Priz~ Court of Berlin affirmed the
decision. It pointed out that the consignment was 'to order' and
therefore there was a presumption that the destination \Vas to
enemy territory. The court refused to accept the distinction argued
for by the claimants between consignments ' 'to ord~r' and consignments to a n~med consignee or his order, saying:
" ' . . . Indeed a bill of lading intended to pass from hand to
hand does not permit one to know from its ovvn contents whether
the first consignee which is found mentioned therein 'vill be the
one who is to receive the merchandise when the transportation has
once been completed. It is just this uncertainty \vhich . . . is decisive with respect to the legal presumption in prize la\v. The
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situation is then ahnost th e san1 e for bills of ladi ng of the sort here
in question as for bills of lading purely to orde r .' ('franslation)"
"The court also pointed out th at th e Ne th erlands Oversea 'frust
\vas set up in cooperation \vith th e Bri tish ; t hat under th e contracts
bet\veen Netherlands i1nporters and th e N .O.T'. th ere \vas no
obstacle to the re-export of goods to England ; and that, indeed,
under the arrangements \Vith the N .O.T. in certain circumstances
goods might be sent back from Netherlands P? r ts to E nglish por ts
for submission to the British prize courts. It held t hat the legal
presumption of enemy destination had not been overcmnc by the
particular circumstances of the case." (Comment on th e case of
Tlze Lupus_, (1917), in Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest of Int ernational

Law_, VII, 55-6.)

. (g) Intervening belligerent port.
1. The Gern1an Imperial Suprerr~e Prize C ourt
condemned The Alexandra) a Danish vessel bound
from Copenhagen to the neutral port of Boston, and
its cargo. The gonds, absolute contrab,and un der the
German rules, was ·condemned because the ship had
intended to stop en route at an enemy British port for
coal. The court stated:
"It must be admitted, in effect, that the enemy destination of
the goods is proven, ~ince before reaching Boston the ship had to
touch there ... only for the purpose of coaling. This interpretation
tough there ... only for the purpose of coaling. This interpretation
follo\vs even from the text of the disposition (Art. 30, par. 1b. of
the German prize ordinance), and it is confirmed by Article 30
of the Declaration of London and by the commentary thereon contained in the General Report. If the ship touches an enemy port, says
the commentary, there will be a strong temptation for the master
to disembark the contraband which he could probably sell at a
high price and there vvould be an equal temptation for the loc ~l
authorities to requisition it. It may be remarked at the same time
that the claimants are not allo,ved to prove that there \Vas a really
neutral destination that this \Vas the intention of the owners."
(The Alexandra_, ( 1917). Garner, ]. W., Prize Law During the
World War_, ( 1927), 536-7).
2. "The N onvegian vessel Semant ha_, \vhile carrying a cargo
listed by Germany as conditional contraband, \Vith directions to
stop at one of the British ports of Queensto\vn, Falmouth, or Ply-
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mouth for orders, was seized by a German vessel and sunk. In
upholding the condemnation of the goods, the Supreme Prize Court
of Berlin admit~ed that the actual destination of the goods in the
case of conditional contraband was decisive. However, there was
no proof as to the destination intended for these goods. The court
applied article 3 7 of the German Prize Ordinance, to the effect
that an enemy destination may be presumed as to a vessel carrying
conditional contraband whose papers either do not show a destination for the voyage or permit the vessel to enter an enemy port.
It held that one of the three ports named in the Semanthd's papers
could be regarded as. the port of destination and that, since all the
ports in question were considered bases of supply for the enemy
armed forces, a presumption of hostile destination arose against the
goods which the claimants did nothing to rebut." (Comment on the
case of The Semantha~ (1916), in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of
I nternationa l Law., VII, 72.)
1

(h) uDummyn consignees.

1. " ... the named 'consigned' must be a real and genuine consignee in the business and commercial sense. The fact that a person
who happens to be in existence is named, if he be merely a nominee
without any interest, or dummy consignee, is not enough." (The
lndianic and The Sydland., (1917). V Lloyd"'s Prize Cases., 267,
279.)

(i) Real consignee not shown.
1. Lord Parker, in upholding the condemnation
of certain cargoes. of conditional contraband consigned to named consignees in Sweden, declared :
" ... The effect of the Order: [the Order in Council of Oct. 29,
1914] is, therefore, to waive the doctrine of continuous voyage
except· in those cases expressly referred to in the modification. The
appellants contend that none of the goods in question in these
appeals can be brought within any of the cases referred to. None
of the goods were consigned 'to order.' The bill of lading, which
formed one of the ship's papers, show·ed in every instance, ':vho was
the consignee of the goods, and neither the bill of lading nor any
other of the ship's papers showed in any instance a consignee of
the goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy.
"Their Lordships are of the opinion that this contention cannot
be sustained. It assumes that the words 'if the ship's papers do not
show· the consignee of the goods' mean 'if the ship's papers do not
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sho\v a consignee of the goods.' . . . the reason for not waiving
the doctrine of continuous voyage in the case of consignments to
order can only have been that jn the case of such consignments the
shipper retains the control of the goods, and can alter their destination as his interests may dictate or circurnstances may admit.
T'hi3 control may, however, be retained by the shipper, even if he
consigns to a named person, provided that the consignee be bound
to indorse or otherwise deal with the bill of lading as directed
by the shipper. It ·would be useless to retain the doctrine of continuous voyage in the case of consignments to order, if the shipper
could escape the doctrine by consigning to a clerk in his office and
•
procuring the clerk to indorse the bill. He would in this manner
retain as full control of the goods as if the consignment had been
to order. It is impossible, in their Lordships' opinion, to construe
the Order as an intimation to neutrals that provided they make
their consignment to named persons not residing in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, they may, in the case of
conditional contraband, safely disregard the doctrine of continuous
voyage . . . . In their Lordships' opinion, the words 'the consignee
of the goods' must mean some person other than the consignor
to whom the consignor parts with the real control of the goods .
. . . the effect of the Order is to make a considerable concession.
Under it merchants in one neutral country can, without risking
the condemnation of their goods, consign them for discharge in
the ports of another neutral country to the order of buyers or others
to whom the principal in the ordinary course of business finally
transfers the control of the goods. They are not concerned to inquire
how such buyers or other persons in tended to deal with the goods
after delivery. No intention on the part of the latter to fonvard the
goods to the enemy Government will render the goods liable to
condemnation." (T.he Louisiana and Other Ships_, (1918). V
Lloyd"s Prize Cases_, 230, 263-5. See also The J(im and other ships,
III Lloyd"s Prize Cases_, 167, 215, 365.)

(j) Named consignee.

1. Coffee, destined from Brazil to a Swedish company in Sweden and carried on The Kronprinsessan
Victoria, a Swedish vessel, was condemned as conditional contraband which \Vas to be forwarded to
Hamburg, Germany. The Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council in .Great , Britain, ho\vever, al-
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though · recognizing that the British Prize Court was
justified in finding that the ulterior destination, ruled
that since the consignees were not "sham" consignees
article 35 of the Declaration of London as modified
by the Order in Council of Oct. 29, 1914, prevented
the capture of the cargo.
The Judicial Committee through Lord Sumner
stated:
" . . . Here the claimants are the_named consignees, and, upon
the case made in the Prize Court, they were consignees to whom
the property has passed before seizure-in fact, the day before. Not
only so, but they were consignees to whom the consignors had
parted with the real control of the goods. Their intention, however, was to give the goods an ulterior enemy destination. Does this
intention prevent them from being persons the insertion of whose
names in the bills of lading causes the ship's papers to 'show who
is the consignee of the goods'? On principle their Lordships think
not. . . . "
" ... This appear~ to be precisely the case, or one of the cases,
in which, under the Order in Council in question, the ship's destination and the form of the ship's papers covered the goods. To
extend the qualities which may be predicated of the consignee,
whom the ship's papers are to show, to qualities connected with his
general trade or with particular contracts, independent of the contract of carriage, would be to protect the goods onl when the
ship's papers show something which in maritime practice they never
do and rarely could show. The coffee was accordingly in this case
immune from condemnation, its ulterior enemy destination not'vithstanding." (The Kronprinsessan Victoria_, (1919). VII Lloyd-'s
Prize Cases_, 230, 256.)

2. In The Oranje Nassau and Other Ships case, the
British seized and condemned cargoes of coffee and
cocoa shipped by a German national domiciled in
Haiti on neutral vessels. The cargoes were destined to
The Nether lands and were consigned to the Netherlands Overseas Trust, for the shipper or a Netherlands bank.
" ... The N.O.T. was established in order to prevent contraband
being sent into Germany, and in order that goods might be
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shipped to them to avoid interference from the British authorities, so that neutral trade might not be molested more than \vas
necessary. But the character in which the N.O.rf. received the
consignments seems to me to depend upon the facts of each particular case. If they received consignments as agents for consignees
who had bought, or purchasers who had bought, the goods, and
who, when they arrived in Holland, had the control over them,
and could direct their ultimate destination as they liked, then the
character of the N.O.T. 'vas that of the purchaser to whom the
goods were going, and the N .O.T. would be consignees within the
meaning of the Order in Council, and the decisions upon it. But
if the N.O.T. were only receiving goods as agents for the consignor,
to dispose of them later for the consignor in the way in which he
directed, then in my opinion they would not be such consignees,
and their position again would be that of the person for 'vhom
they were receiving the goods . . . . it does not seem to me that it
can be said that the N.O.T. were persons other than the consignor
who had the complete control of the goods." (The Oranje Nassau
and Other Ships., (1919). IX Lloyd.~s Prize Cases., 189, 192-3. See
also The Noordam., ( 1919). VIII Lloyd.~s Prize Cases., 337.)

(k) Trade Statistics.
1. "A French decree of July 7, 1916 established the presumption
of hostile destination in the case of absolute contraband on a ship
destined to the ports of a neutral country adjacent to enemy territory when the imports into the neutral country 'vere largely in
exces~ of · the normal pre-war importations. The French Prize
Council applied this decree in condemning a cargo of wine and
spirits sent from Spain to Denmark on a Danish vessel, when it was
sh~wn that the normal peacetime importation of wines and spirits
amounted to 4,318 metric tons, while the 1916 importations
amounted to 35,832 metric tons." (Comment on the case of T lze
Tiber., ( 1918), in Hackworth, G. "H ., Digest of International
Law.~ VII, 52-3.)

2. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
in dismissing the appeal of the shippers from .a condemnation of a cargo of dried fruits, stated:
" ... The President has found that the statistical evidence establishes a case 'vhich throws upon the appellants the onus of showing that the goods were not going to Germany. Thei~ Lordships
concur in this opinion. There is ample statistical evidence to replace
an obligati9n on th~ appellant? t9 ?how that the destination of the
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goods is innocent. The President fu r ther finds that it is impossible
for him to say that the appellants have discharged the onus thrown
upon them, and their Lordships concur in this finding." (The U rna_,
(1920). IX Lloyd's Prize Cases 104, 114.)
3. See also the following cases: T.he Kim_,· The A !fred Nobel_,·
The Bjornsterjne Bjornson_,· The Fridland_, ( 1915). III Lloyd~s
Prize C'ases_, 167, 294-5. The Kronprinse.ssan Victoria_, ( 1919).
VII Lloyd"'s Prize Cases_, 230, 246. The Oranje . Nassau and Other
Ships_, (1919). IX Lloyd~s Prize Cases_, 189, 201.
)

(I) Assurances against re-export.
Some of the European neutral countries tried to
assure the belligerents that certain goods if imported
into the country would not be re-exported. This
assurance was attempted by the promulgation of laws
prohibiting the export of those certain commodities
and the establishment of government purchasing commissions. Both Great Britain and Germany _did not
believe that the laws at least, were enough to prevent re-export.
1. " ... It is true, no doubt, that the municipal laws of both
Denmark and Sweden prohibit the export of fodder stuffs, but it
is not clear that this prohibtion includes transshipment at Danish
or Swedish ports, or that licenses for export are not readily granted
by the Danish or Swedish authorities, at any rate if the stuffs in
question are not really needed for home consumption. The experience of the laws referred to, however stringent, can be evaded."
(The Louisiana and Other Ships_, ( 1918). V Lloyd"'s Prize Cases_,

230, 257-8.)
2. "In a case involving the consignment of dried fruits to the
Swedish Victualing Commission, which dealt in such goods for the
purpose of 'monopolizing that trade for bona fide Swedish consumption,' the British Prize Court found that the Commission did
its best to carry out its announced purpose and that the goods in
question belonged to the Commission and were bonar fide intended
for consumption in Sweden." (Comment on the case of The Pacific~·
The San Francisco_, ( 1917), in Hackworth, G. H., A Digest of
International Law_, VII, 62-3. See VII Lloyd"' s Prize Cases_, 75.)
3. "In the case of The Brage_, the German Imperial Supreme
Prize Court sustained the decision of the Kiel Prize c ·o urt to condemn a cargo of conditional contraband ·which \Vas destined for
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Sweden but consigned 'to order.' T'he German Imperial Supreme
Prize Court held that it had been shown that in the contract of
sale for the goods ·it had been stated that the goods were for consumption in Sweden and that the Swedish Government prohibited
export from Sweden of goods such as these." ( 1'he Brage_, ( 1917).
Garner, J. W., Prize L !arw During the World War} ( 1927), 573.)
4. "A Norwegian vessel carrying linseed oil (conditional contraband) from Rotterdam to Norway, consigned to order of named
consignees living in Norway, was seized by a German warship.
rfhe claimants showed that the oil was to be used in Norway for
the manufacture of edible fats which would not be consumed in
Norway but which would be held there until the end of the war.
The Norwegian Government prohibited the export of these products. The German Imperial Supre1ne Prize Court upheld the condemnation of the cargo as conditional contraband with a hostile
destination. The court said that when goods were consigned to
order there was a presurnption of hostile destination although the
ship was seized while on a voyage to a neutral port and that the
existence of an export prohibition in the neutral country was not
sufficient to overcome this presumption of hostile destination. The
intention of the claimants was held to be not decisive." (Comment
on the case· of The Norden} (1918) in Hackworth, G. H., Dig·eiSt
of International Law_, VII, 63.)

( 6) N avicerts.
In order to avoid friction with neutral countries
as much as possible, Great Britain in 1916 instituted
a system of navicerts or letters of assurance. Under
this system, neutral goods were given a kind of commercial passport before they were shipped, insuring
in passage more freedom from interference by the
British Contraband Control System.
1. "The term n:arv icert (or letters of assurance) is applied to
documents issued by officials of a belligerent state, indicating that
the cargo of a vessel sailing from a neutral port corresponds to the
manifest. Its purpose is to serve as a 'sort of· commercial passport,'
to facilitate the passage of the vessel and avoid the necessity of
search of the cargo by the belligerent, but it does not convey any
guaranty that the vessel and cargo 'vill be free from seizure or
interference." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law_, VII, 212.)
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2. "This system, which first became operative in March, 1916,
\vhen it was made applicable to cargoes shipped from the United
States to the Scandinavian countries adjacent . to Germany, \vas
in substance a system \vhereby particular consignments of goods
were given what might be called a commercial passport before
they \vere shipped; this passport, which derived its name from the
code-word 'navicert,' insured the consignment an undisturbed
passage." (Ritchie, H., The uNavicertn System during the World
If/ arJ (Washington, 1938).)
3. "N avicerts were given a validity of two months extending
from the date of issue up to the time of shipment. No fee was
charged for their issue, bu~ the applicant was expected to defray his
share of the cost of the abbreviated telegrams to London \Vhere
such inquiry was necessary. It was arranged by the Ernbassy that
the navicert issued, or if need be a duplicate, should be furnished
to the shipping company, in order that it might accomp~ny the
shipment, being removed by the boarding officer on the vessels'
arrival at a British port. It was further arranged that the distinguishing mark and number of each navicert should be entered
against the item of cargo on the ship's manifest covered by it, and
British consular officers at ports in the United States \Vere notified
by the Embassy of the issue of navicerts, and instructed to exercise
a general supervision over the entries so made. On the arrival of
the vessel at a British port each consignment covered by a navicert
could thus be readily identified by the boarding officer, and telegraphed to the Contraband Committee for purposes of verification
and record." (Ritchie, H., The uNavicertn Sy~tem during the
World War, (Washington, 1938), 10.)
4. "N avicerts were worded as follows: 'As far as is at present
kno\vn there would appear to be no objection on the part of the
British Government to this consignment.'" (Ritchie,. H., The
uNavicertn System during the World WarJ (Washington,
1938), 1.)

5. "From the outset the system is said to have \vorked satisfact?rily, and, as it attained fuller development, to have conferred
advantages which have been shortly summarized as follo\vs: Exporters and shipping companies were exposed to a minimum of
delay and inconvenience; parties were spared the cost of insurance
against risk of detention; quicker clearance could be given to
vessels; obj ectionable shipments were to a large extent eliminated;
B ritish ports did not have to be encumbered by the discharge of
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cargoes; w hile the syste1n also enabled a statistical record to be
maintained in advance of the imports of the receiving countries."
(Ritchie, H. , Th e uNavicer() System d uring the World War)

10-1.)
6. " . .. About the time I \vas appointed the Consul-General
of the United States came to see me, and he pointed out to me.
'Y ou say in your diplomatic representations to the United States
that, after all, British goods suffer just as much as American goods
from the blockade, and th at we are not really injuring American
goods and American traders in any w ay beyo nd th e injury which
the British trader suffers. T'hat is not quite righ t, because the
British trader can go to your War 'frade D epa r tment befo re he
makes any arrangements \Vith regard to the shipping of the goods
and he can obtain a license ... . That is not the case in th e United
States. Cannot you· do something to supply that want? ' \Ve t hereupon organized a system of Letters of AJssurance, as it is called
in the States. It is perfectly voluntary. Nobody need take out
letters of assurance unless he wished to do so, but if he likes to
go to our authorities there and make inquiries whether a particular
ship is likely to meet with difficulty, he can obtain from those
authorities in America letters of assurance, and then the goods,
generally speaking, unless something exceptional intervenes, go
through without any trouble or difficulty. That device has been
of enormous importance in smoothing the difficulties which had
before then existed with America, and it has been of equal importance in enabling us to know exactly what is going on in reference to exports from the United States to these neutral countries.
It has enabled us, without any unfairness or injustice, to regulate
the supplies to these neutral countries." (Lord Robert Cecil, as
Minister of Blockade in the House of Commons, Mar. 27, 1917.
Parliamentary Debates~ House of Commons, 5th ser., vol. 92,
col. 254.)
7. "At the present time all goods which leave the United Kingdom
[States] for European destinations, practically without exception,
are covered by British 'letters of assurance' or equivalent documents.
This means that the shippers consult the British authorities in the
United States before forwarding their goods, and give certain
guarantees that the ultimate destination of the goods is satisfactory.
Then the ship proceeds on its way, and the cargo is examined
either at Halifax, Kirkwall or Lerwick, .to see that it is in order,
and the enforced call at an intermediate port of course involves
considerable danger to the ship, and great loss of time of time in the
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manipulation of the cargo." (Consul General at London, Skinner, to Ambassador to Great Britain, Page, April 3, 1917,
enclosure. United States Foreign Relations_, 1917, Supplement 2,
vol. II, 804.)
8. "In a discussion between the American Consul General at
London and representatives of the British War Trade Intelligence
Department 'It was agreed that the navicert system, which has been
in operation for over a year and which is now thoroughly understood both by shippers and importers, should if possible be maintained .... It was considered that the proportion of navicerts which
had been dishonoured was extremenly small, probably no more than
one in five hundred." (Memorandum of the British War Trade Intelligence Department. Com~ent in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of
International Law_, VII, 214. United States Foreign Relations_,
1917, Supplement 2, vol. II, 803, 806~)

9. During negotiations between Great Britain and
the United States concerning enemy commerce, the
Joint Subcommittee on Export Licenses reported on
May 14, 1917:
"Hitherto, the only control over exports from the United States
has been carried out by the system of letters of assurance issued
by the British Embassy in the case of shipments to Norway, Sweden
and Denmark. These letters of assurance represent simply a statement made to such American exporters as may apply to the British
Embassy that so far as the .British Government is aware, and subject
to new fac~s coming their knowledge subsequent to the issue of the
letter, there ·is no objection to the shipment of the articles through
the British naval patrols. Consequently, a letter of assurance is not
a license but simply a facility and operates as a pass attached to
the goods for the information of the examining officer at the British
port of call, or the British naval patrol.
"In order that such a pass may be as certain and effective as possible applications for letters of assurance are referred by the
British Embassy to London by telegraph in all cases where the character of the consignee or the amount of the shipment raises any
doubt as to its ultimate destination. The letter of assurance thus
merely aims at assuring the exporter a maximum of certainty that
the goods will reach their destination without difficulty and with the
minimum amount of delay in examination." ( Unite.d States Foreign
Relations_, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. II, 849.)
10. " ... There was also in existence at that time a system de~

, 73
signed for the convenience of honest Neutral traders \vhereby
British Consular Officers in Neutral ports issued certificates upon
being satisfied as to the character and destination of cargo intended,
so far as appea red, for Neutral consumption. The fact that the
British Consul-General issued a certificate for this cargo has been
treated as tending to found a claim. I cannot give effect to that.
It was a mitigation in favour of Neutrals of the stringent procedure
which was being exercised and intended to be exercised by the British Government in the exercise of its rights as a belligerent, and the
Neutral shipowner or shipper or consignee who took advantage of
it, took advantage of it \Vith the defects which were inherent in it,
and subject to the defects which arose by the nature of the system
out of which the giving of certificates arose." (The F. ]. Lisman~
1919. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of lnterna:t ional Law~ VII, 215.)

7. Neutral Goods on Enemy Ships.
Neutral goods were safe on an enemy ship if they
'were not contraband. Most of the cases involving
this principle arose out of captures made in the first
months of vVorld War I.
1. In The Schlesien case, 1914, the British Prize Court said that
a submarine signaling device, American-ow ned, in a German merchant vessel was not "neutral goods" within the meaning of the
Declaration of Paris. Therefore, the device was condemned. (The
Schlesien~ 1914, II Lloyd's Prize Cases, 92.)
2. In regard to a shipment of pepper on the German vessel
Schlesien~ the United States Department of State said: " . . . it
appears that the shipment of pepper in question was made on a
German merchant vessel from Batavia bound for Bremen, fro~
which point the pepper was to be transshipped to Baltimore. Under
the generally recognized principles of international law, this pepper,
consigned to a neutral and shipped before the outbreak of hostilities, is not contraband and is not the lawful subject of confiscation
or condemnation. But you are informed that the vessel in which
the pepper was shipped, being a German vessel, is subject to seizure
on the high seas by any of the countries with \Vhich Germany is
at war, and if the vessel is or shall be captured, the part of your
goods vvhile not subject to confiscation, will necessarily undergo
the delay and risks of the seizure of the vessel." (Counselor for the
Department of State, Lansing, to Parrish Brothers, Inc., Aug. 1),
1914. Comment In Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International
Law, VII, 11.)
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3. The Acting Secretary of State Lansing in October 1914 inquired of the Ambassador to Germany Gerard, who in turn asked
the German Government, whether prize court proceedings would
be held in regard to American-owned cargoes on board British
vessels sunk by German belligerent action. The reply was in the
affirmative. (United States Foreign Relations~ 1914, 330, 336.)
4. In two cases in 1915, The Glitra and The Indian Prince~ German courts refused to compensate or restore to neutral owners of
goods on enemy ships seized or sunk. (The Glitra:~ 1915, United
States Foreign Relations~ 1915, Supplenzent~ 350, 572. The Indian
Prince, 1915. United States Foreign Relations~ 1915, Supplement~

520, 522.)
5. In the case of The

Marth-Bockhalzn~

•
1919, The French

~on

seil d'Etat said that non-contraband cargo owned by an American
aboard a German vessel captured by tl}e French should be released,
since the owner had proved his neutral nationality. (The MarthBockhahn~ 1919. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~
VII, 11-12.)

8. Non--Contraband.
After the expansion of the contraband lists, little
except hospital supplies were considered as noncontraband and exempt from capture. At times discussions even arose about the status of hospital sup-,
plies.
1. "While hospital supplies usually received a measure of consideration in transit from neutral to belligerent countries, other
articles were from time to time allowed to be exported. Some neutral states, owing to weakness, protested and submitted to restrictions generally admitted to be beyond the limits of legality. Some
neutral states, for reasons less evident, submitted to unjustifiable
interference with commerce." (United States Naval War College,
International Law Situations~ 1933, 23.)
2. Some articles, besides hospital supplies, which were considered
supposedly as of no utility in war were mentioned now and again
in dispatches.
"Proclamation issued to-day requires that all articles exported
to Holland be consigned to Dutch Government, diplomatic or consular offices, vvith permission of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or
Netherlands Overseas Trust, except printed matter, returned containers, worn clothing and personal effects, live animals not used
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for food, sanitary earthenware, pottery and common earthenware,
books, dolls, toys, wooden clock cases, slate and slate pencils, postage
stamp and postcard albums. Proclamation apparently intended to
permit free shipment of ar ticles here mentioned." (Consul General
at London, Skinner, to the Secretary of State, December 23, 1916.
United States Foreign Relations~ 1916, Supplement~ 490.)
3. In a telegram to the Secretary of State the American Ambassador in Spain on September 22, 1914 said:
"In an interview yesterday morning His Majesty informed me
confidentially condition of wounded soldiers, par6cularly in French
hospitals where there are inadequate supplies, especially of bandages
and absorbent cotton, was deplorable and expressed an earnest
wish for our cooperation in relieving this situ~tion. To that end he
hopes that the United States and Spanish Ambassadors accredited
near various European courts now at war will make a joint request
for arrangements between countries of hospital supplies and the
such supplies in transit on the high seas may be considered by them
neither contraband nor conditional contraband of vvar but free.
Please telegraph whether Department can see its way clear to give
to our diplomatic officers C<?ncerned the instructions necessary to
realize His Majesty's, hope.'' United States Foreign Relations~ 1914,
Supplement~ 831. United States Naval War College, International
Law SituationsJ 1933, 23-4.)
4. The American diplomatic representatives in the belligerent
countries were instructed by the State Department to communicate
this request. A general agreement in principle was obtained. The
Geman reply stated:
"Your circular September 24. The Foreign Office replies to joint
request that No. 28, paragraph 1, of the German prize ordinance of
September 30, 1909, already provides that articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded shall not be treated as contraband
and may be requisitioned subject to payment compensation only in
case of urgent military necessity and when their destination is to
the territory of the enemy or to territory occupied by the enemy
or to the armed forces of the enemy." (United Stales Foreign Relations~ 1914, SupplementJ 835. (United States Naval War College,
International Law SituationsJ 1933, 24.)
5. The French Government stated:
"While appreciating the humanitarian attitude of the United
States Government, the French Government does not think the
moment propitious for agreement between belligerents, even on a
subject vvhich by its character could be placed beyond reach of

76
conflict. Experience of' contempt which certain belligerents sho\v for
international conventions to which they have agreed gives grounds
for apprehension that they would not observe a new agreement nor
execute its provisions as soon as it was to their advantag·e not to
do so. The French Government recalls that definition of objects
mentioned in Article 29 of the Declaration of London was summarily made in the general r·eport at the London conference by the
drafting committee, and it was thus agreed that the immunity
established under Article 29 applied to drugs and various medicines.
The French Government adds that while it might be a delicate
matter to be more precise and extend obligations of belligerents
during vvar beyond where they were fixed in time of peace, nevertheless it would not refuse to study the suggestions of the American
Government to draw· up a list of drugs and medicines whose
ch~racter as 'articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and vvounded' shall be closely defined." (United States Foreign RelationsJ
1914, Supplement 836. United States Naval War College, International Law SituationsJ 1933, 24.)
6. "Since the beginning of the pre~ent war, the American Red
Cross has invited contributions of money and supplies with which
to aid the wounded and suffering of all the belligerents. We have
shipped to the Red Cross societies of ·each belligerent hospital supplies contributed to us for that purpose. We have found no difficulty in sending such article to the Entente Allies. We have had to
obtain permits from Great Britain for the shipments to the Red
Cross of the Central powers. Until September 1915, there was substantially no delay in the granting of these permits by Great Britain.
Since that time, we have had much difficulty in securing them, and
the supplies donated in kind and designated for the use of the Central powers have accumulated in our warehouses in New York. A
permit was granted for only one shipment since that time-in J anuary of this year. Through your pepartment, we are now in receipt of
a communication from the British Government, announcing that it
does not intend to permit any further shipments, unless it is a
shipment to our own hospital units, in a territory of the Central
powers. 'This exception amounts to no concession, for the reason
that as the British Government was advised in August last, after
the first of October, for lack of funds, we were able to maintain
no hospital units in any of the belligerent countries. The authorities
of the American Red Cross believe that under the Geneva convention, to vvhich the United States and all the belligerent po,vers are
signatories, the United States has the treaty right to insist that
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articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded in the form
of hospital supplies, shipped by th e A rnerican Red Cross to the
Red C ross of the Central powers, shall not be declared contraband,
but shall be allovved safe-conduct to t heir destination:" ( Ex-President Taft, then chairman of the cent ral comm ittee of the American
Red Cross to the Secretary of State, May 8, 1916. U nited States
Foreign R elations, 1916, Supplem ent~ 948 . Un ited St ates Naval
War College, I nterna tional Law Situations~ 25.)
1

7. Secretary of State Hull before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations~ 1936.
1. "The next thing that seemed to have been demonstrated by the
World War was that, unlike preceding periods and preceding \vars
of consequence, this was not a war between the military forces of
nations alone, not a war between soldiers; it was a war between
the combined populations, civil and military. It was not a war
involving the use of military implements and instruments alone,
but it was practically a test of the economic strength as well as the
military strength of the nations.
"The result was that the belligerent in control of the seas said,
to all practical intents and purposes, 'We have to make absolute
contraband what has been called conditional contraband in the
past. We have practically to prevent commerce between neutrals
and our, enemies either directly or indirectly.
~

"The result was that the doctrine of continuous voyage was expanded to cover virtually all commerce. The nation in control of
the seas, before the war ended, dominated almost every dollar's
worth of commerce between neutrals and any part of Europe. That
\Vas through the •expanding of the whole doctrine of contraband,
conditional contraband, and also, as I have said, the doctrine of
continuous voyage, and furthermore, through curtailing other
rights of neutrals. In other words, nearly all of what had theretofore been the ordinary rules of neutrality and neutral rights were
more or less set aside, so that when the war ended there was in
several respects virtual chaos so far as neutral rights were concerned."
" ... When the United States entered the war it issued instructions for the Navy, June 30, 1917, which set f~rth a general list of
contraband which may be considered almost as inclusive as the
British list of 1916. In this American contraband list there was no
expressed distinction between absolute and conditional contraband.
Destination was the deciding factor."
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" ... I should like to say that the situation when the war ended
apparently was that the whole law ... on the subject of contraband,
absolute and conditional, had been merged into the one subject of
contraband, absolute. The question of destination to some extent
figured . . ." (Testimony by Secretary Cordell Hull before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the proposed N·eutrality Act of 1936, Jan. 10, 1936. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 74th Congress, 2d session, Jan. 10,
1936 on S. 3474 regarding Neutrality, 11-2, 38, 39.)

9. Harvard Draft Convention on the Rights and
Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial
War, 1939.
This draft convention is an at!empt to resolve the
conflict between neutral and belligerent rights. The
principle underlying this proposal is as follows: on
the one hand grant to the belligerents a broadened
conception of blockade, and on the other hand give
the neutrals more adequate guarantees for the protection of legitimate inter-neutral trade. The hope
for result, of course, is less interruption of th~ comn1ercial life of the world in time of war.
_This plan grapples, therefore, with the difficult
problems of continuous voyage and ultimate destination. To solve these questions, the draft convention
proposes that the neutral states accept new duties in
regard to the supervision of goods received in their
'ports but intended to pass on to a belligerent. Trade
between two neutrals is to be free and is to be protected by a certificate system for which both neutral
and belligerent states are to be responsible. Under this
certificate system contraband lists would be unnecessary, eliminating an objectionable feature of past
practices in time of vvar.
( 1) The Draft Convention~ 1939.
Article 40. "Except as otherwise provided in this Convention,
a belligerent may not interrupt trade in neutral vessels between
two neutral ports.''
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A r ticle 41 . "A neut ra l State may issue certificates of neutrality in accordance w ith th e rules lai d do\vn in Annex I I to this
Convention.''
Article 42. " ( 1) Prior to the clearance of a vessel with a certificate of neutrality from its ter rito ry, a n eutral State shall give
a public notice of departure containing :
" (a) ]'he name of the vessel, its tonnage, time of departure,
approximate route, destination, probable time of arrival
thereat and general description of the ship and its cargo;
" (b) If the vessel is convoyed, an adequate identification of the
convoying warship or warships.
" ( 2) if the announced departure of the vessel is del ayed , or if
other announced details are altered, a corrected notice shall be
issued.
" ( 3) A certified copy of the notice shall be given to the master
of each vessel named therin.
" ( 4) A neutral State may also give publicity by radio to notices
of departure. Upon the request of a belligerent, a neutral State
shall use the radio facilities at its disposal to bring to the kno·wledge
of belligerent warships or aircraft at sea notices of departure, but
such messages may not be sent in code."
Article 43. In regard to neutral convoys.
Article 44 ~ Convoyed neutral ships with Certificates of N eutrality to be painted white and carry certain lights, etc.
Article 45. Neutral state to prevent uncertified vessels from
leaving with similar paint and markings.
Article 46. Penalties for neutral ships violating these regulations.
Article 4 7. " ( 1) A quota limitation is required for imports into
a neutral State if demanded by a belligerent in accordance vvith
th~ provisions of this article. ·
" ( 2) A belligerent may demand that a neutral State publish
monthly data as to its imports, their amount, value, disposition
or ultimate utilization, and data as to its exports, their amount,
value and destination, if there are being imported into the neutral
State goods which
" (a) are publicly listed by any of the belligerents as to use in
war; and
" (b) are of a kind which the enemy of the demanding belligerent
imports directly or indirectly; and
" (c) are either imported into the ·neutral State for exports
in their original or in a processed state, or imported
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in amounts exceeding normal peace time imports, taking
into account normal expansion not due to supplying war
demands in belligerent markets.
" ( 3) A neutral State shall at once proceed with the publication
as demanded.
" ( 4) Ho-w ever, if the neutral State does not agree that factual
conditions exist justifying the demand, it shall so notify the demanding belligerent. At the same time it shall designate one of its nationals who, ·with a person designated by the belligerent, shall choose
a national of a third State; and these three persons shall constitute
an arbitral board to determine \vhether the factual conditions
exist justifying the demand. If a majority of the board decides that
the belligerent has made out a prima facie case under paragraphs
(a), (b), and (c) of section (2) of this article, the neutral State
shall continue the publication as demanded; if a majority of the
board decides that the belligerent has not made out such a prima
facie case, the neutral State may cease publication.
" ( 5) If the belligerent is not satisfied by the neutral State's
published statements that g0ods imported by the neutral State are
not reaching its enemy in their original or in a processed state,
it may notify all neutral States that it demands the fixing of a
quota in accordance with Annex III to this Convention.
" ( 6) The publication of data as required under section ( 2)
of this article may be dispensed with if the neutral State consents
to the fixing of a quota under section ( 5) ."
Article 48. " ( 1) A neutral State may also issue a certificate of
~eutrality to a vessel cove~ed by an agreement made by the neutral
State with both belligerents.
" ( 2) Such an agreement may specify the commodities and define
the quantities thereof which may be shipped from the neutral State
by private persons to a belligerent or from a belligerent to a neutral
State under guaranty of safe passage.
" ( 3) Such an agreement may be made for specific voyages or for
specified periods of time. It may provide for cancellation upon notice
in case of fraud or violation of its terms.
" ( 4) Such an agreement may specify that certificates of neutrality may be issued even though the shipment be made in a vessel
flying a belligerent flag.
" ( 5) Beyond supervision of leading and certification, the neutral
State is not responsible fo r_ the execution of such an agreement."
Article 61. " ( 1) If a vessel does not display the distinctive colors
and markings required of a certified vessel under A rticle 44, or fails
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to produce a ce r tificate of neutrality, and if the belligeren t as a
r esult of visit and search has reasonable grounds for belief that the
vessel or its cargo is subj ect to condemnation or preemption, the belligerent may captu re th e vessel an d co nduct or send it to one of its
po r ts for prize proceedings. I f to cond uct or send the captured
vessel to port would involve danger to the safety of the captor or to
the success of th e ope r ations in w hich he is · engaged at the time,
t he captured vessel may be destroyed subj ect to com pliance 'vith
the r ules laid do,vn in Article 54. I n such cases pr ize proceedings
shall be held on the basis of the ship 's papers and other lawful
evidence."
Ar ticle 63. "A prize court shall be bound by the follow ing rules:
" (a) A vessel which intended to run a blockade, may be condemned together with its cargo."
" (b) Cargo destined for a blockaded port by sea, may be condemned; the vessel may also be condemned if the destination of
the cargo was knovvn to the o'vner, charterer or master of the
vessel."
" (e) Cargo destined for belligerent territory either directly or
through a neutal port, may be condemned in so far as it is composed
of arms, ammunition or implements of war, or of other goods shipped in violation of a neutral State's prohibition under Article 11.
If more than half of the cargo by value, weight, volume or freight
is composed of goods which may be condemned, the rest of the
cargo and the vessel are similarly subject to condemnation."
" (f) Any commodity in a cargo destined for a neutral State
upon whose imports of that commodity a quota has been fixed
under Article 47, but not included within a portion of the quota
allocation to the State from vvhich the commodity was shipped, may
be condemned."
" (g) Enemy vessels and such parts of their cargo as are of
enemy ownership may be condemned; the disposition of neutral
cargo is not affected by the fact that it is carried in a belligerent
vessel, but neutral cargo belonging to the owner, charterer, or
master of a vessel which , under Article 64 or 65 a belligerent may
treat as an enemy vessel, may be coridemned."
" (h) Cargo destined for • unblockaded belligerent territory
or for a neutral port affording convenient access to belligerent
territory and not subject to condemnation under preceding para:
graphs of this article, may be preempted by the capturing _belligerent
upon payment of the market price current in its territory on the
date of the arrival of the prize in port, plus ten per cent."
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" ( j) Enemy ownership or ongtn of cargo on a neutral vessel
does not affect the disposition of the cargo: 'free ships make free
goods.'"
"(n1) Postal correspondence on a captured neutral vessel is inviolable, unless it is being carried to or from a blockaded place
on a vessel vvhich is subject to condemnation for breach of blockade."
" ( n) Postal parcels may be treated as cargo." (Draft Convention
on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and A erial
War~ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 33 American 1 ournal of I nt~r
national La· w~ Supplement~ 1939), 181-4, 187-9.)
( 2) Draft Convention Comments.
(a) Contraband in general. uUnder the Declaration of London
of 1909, neutral vessels were free to trade w·ith other neutral States
but subject to the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage
if the cargo contained absolute contraband. Neutral vessels were
also free to trade with belligerent ports, if the ports were not
blockaded and if the cargo contained only non-contraband goods.
Neutral vessels carrying contraband and destined for a belligerent
port or carrying non-contraband and destined for a blockaded port
were subject to capture."
uUnder t.he practices prevailing in the War of 1914-1918, the
first type of trade was severely limited by the extension of the
doctrine of continuous voyage into that of ultimate destination, its
application to conditional as well as to absolute contraband, ·and
the expansion of the contraband lists to a point at which the free
list became practically non-existent. The extension of blockade
principles to neutral coasts and the establishment of war zones on
the high seas further crippled this trade. The second type of
trade-from neutral States to belligerents-,vas practically eliminated by the s~me extensions of contraband .lists. Some modifications in favor of neutral trade were introduced by agreements
permitting neutrals to import freely certain goods on agreeing to
supply belligerents with certain other goods."
•
uu nder this Draft Convention~ trade betvveen neutrals 'vould
receive maximum safeguards. From the earliest times the problem
has been to reconcile conflicting economic interests of neutrals and
belligerents. A belligerent naturally desires to prevent his enemy
from obtaining supplies of any kind. A) neutral naturally desires
to continue his trade without any restriction resulting from the
war of other States. The rules of contraband, blockade, etc., gre'v
up from an attempt to reach a compromise between these conflicting
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interests." (General Comment~ Draft Convention on the Rights
and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and A erial War~ (Harvard
La\V School, 1939). 33 American Journal of International Law~
Supplement~ ( 1939 ), 488.)
(b) On contraband lists. "The history of the law of contraband
of vvar is particularly interesting. For m ore than t\vo centuries it
has been agreed that actual arms and ammunition fall within the
contraband category. But as soon as one leaves a very narrow list,
differences of opinion appear. An analysis of the treaty provisions
during the last one hundred and fifty years shows the wide disparity
of definitions of contraband upon \vhich States from time to time
have agreed."
"~lthough at the present time it is recognized that there is a

distinction between goods absolutely contraband and goods conditionally contraband, little note has been taken of the fact that this
distinction is, as a matter of general practice, very recent. There
is not a single bipartite treaty concluded in the last one hundred
and fifty years which makes a clear distinction between the two
kinds of contraband and there are only two treaties which suggest
any such distinction at all. A complete anyalsis of the national
laws and regulations has not been made, but the indications are that
even in naval instructions and the like, the distinction is of comparatively recent appearance. The distinction was fully recognized
at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and was the basis for the
rules on this subject drawn up in the Declaration of London. Earlier
examples of an acknowledgment of the distinction may, of course,
be found, and the idea itself is usually traced to the classifications
of Grotius."
.
" . . . it cannot be said that a clear distinction between goods
absolutely and conditionally contraband has any deep historical
roots in the development of the subject."
"There has never been a general agreement among the States of
the world as t.o just what articles are contraband. From the seventeenth century on, many States have taken the position that a
contraband list might properly be proclaimed by a belligerent during the course of a war and that the belligerent vvas subject only
to general limitations in deciding upon the specific articles which
were to be included in such a list."
"As is well known, during the vVar of 1914-1918, contraband
lists were enormously extended . to a point at which they became
practically all-inclusive; the distinction betvveen goods absolutely
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contraband and goods conditionally contrabrand was practically
abandoned by a number of States, although the United States
support its continuance."
The Harvard Draft Convention contains no contraband lists,
because it would have no useful purpose. "The attempt made in
the De~laration of London to draw up one list of goods absolutely
contraband and another list of goods conditionally contraband and
a third free list, proved to be of practically no value, thus supporting the view of the United States at the Second Hague Conference
that it is impossible 'to formulate a list of articles on contraband
that would continue satisfactory for a period of years.' " ( General Commen t ~ Draft Conveintion on t.he Rights and Duties of
_V eutral States in Naval a~nd A erial War~ (Harvard Law School,
1939). 33 American Journal of International Law~ Supplement~

( 1939)' 488-9, 498-9.)
(c) On destination of neutral cargo. "On the other hand, the
distinction as to the destination of neutral cargo-on the one hand
to the territory of a belligerent and on the other hand to the government or the armed forces-is very old and it is easy to find in
the early practices the roots from which the modern notions about
goods conditionally contraband ha.ve sprung." (General Comment~
Draft Convention on the Rgihts and Duties of Neutral States in
Naval and A erial TV ar~ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 33 A merican Journal of International Law~ Supplement~ (1939), 498.)

(d) On plan of Harvard Draft Convention in regard to contraband:
"At the Second Hague Conference, the British Government proposed that the principle of contraband of war be abolished."
"The proposal failed because of the opposition of Germany,
France and Russia, but twenty-five States supported the proposal,
with Japan, Panama, Rumania and Turkey not voting. The opposition to the British proposal, as expressed by th ~ German delegate, was based on the fact that the suggested abolition of contraband was linked with a new description of a type of unneutral
service which was said to place a greater restriction on neutral
commerce than did the traditional law of contraband."
"Montenegro also opposed the British proposal and the United
States like·wise voted against it. The opposition of the United
States, however, rested upon special grounds and does not seem to
have been comparable to the opposition of Germany, France and
Russia."

..
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"In vievv of the long history of conflict attending the subject of
contraband and in vie'v of the app<!rent irnpossibility of defining
it in a satisfactory 'vay, it is believed that the only solution lies
in reviving t he British proposal in 1907. However, just as the
British proposal failed in 1907, any similar proposal would probably also fail unless it took account of the traditional and inevitable
# point of vievv of belligerents who will never tolerate the free
shipment of essential war materials to the enemy if they have the
physical po,ver to prevent it. The proposals contained in this Draft
therefore contemplate some extensions of the belligerent right of
blockade."
"With the development of submarines and aircraft and also with
developments in the use of mines, it is now possible even for States
'vhich are not dominant maritime Powers to blockade enemy coasts.
'fhere will, of course, be situations in which the superior power of
one belligerent will make a blockade by the qther State ineffective,
but obviously a convention dealing with neutral rights can not
guide itself by the principle of equalizing unequal belligerent
power. "
"There vvould seem to be very obvious advantages to neutral
trade if trade were free except to blockaded places even though
notions of blockade be somewhat broadened. It is believed that a
large part of the difficulty will be removed if adequate guarantees
are offered for the protection of bona fide inter-neutral trade. This
makes it necessary to grapple with the extremely difficult problem
of continuous voyage and ultimate destination. This is not, however, an insoluble problem. If neutral States recognize that by the
assumption of additional duties in regard to exports to belligerents,
they can achieve a large measure of freedom for their sea-borne
commerce, the result should be that war would involve less interruption of the commercial life of the world than is the case under
the existing rules of international law and existing situations which
make breaches of that law all too frequent." (General Comment~
Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in
Naval and A 1erial War~ (Harvard Law School, 1939). 33 A merican I ournal of International Law~ Supplement~ ( 1939), 499-500.)
(e) Summary of this Draft Convention~ s system. "Trade between two neutral States is free and is protected by a system of
certificates for the accuracy of which both neutral and belligerent
States make themselves responsible. As a further protection such
vessels may be convoyed."

•
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"Neutral States must accept new burdens in regard to the supervision of goods received in their ports but intended to pass in transit
to a belligerent."
"In Article 48 it is contemplated that a neutral State may ,.enter
into a tripartite agreement vvith both belligerent parties relative to
certified and protected trade with the belligerents in specified commodities of definite amounts; instances of some·what analogous
agreements may be found during the War of 1914-1918."
"In certain cases quotas may be established to limit the imports
of goods by a neutral where continuous voyage to a belligerent
territory is alleged by a belligerent."
"If a neutral vessel wishes to carry goods to a belligerent port
or if it desires to carry to a neutral porf a cargo which may not
under the rules be certified, the venture is wholly at the risk of
the neutral individual, subject to Article 63·, which in certain cases
limits the belligerent right to one of pre-emption. This device has
been utilized frequently in the past, notably in the Jay Treaty of
1794 between the United States and Great Britain, as a meal).S of
solving the quandary created by the inability to agree upon a
contraband list. In all such cases, however, there must be definite
assurance regarding the safety of the lives of passengers." (General
CommentJ Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of Neutral
States in Naval and A erial W arJ (Harvard Law School, 1939).
33 American Journal of International LawJ SupplementJ (1939),

( 500-1.)
(f) On air tra1/Jic. "In certified and convoyed aircraft the neutral can send to another neutral all postal correspondence; all
passengers who are not i~ belligerent service; and all cargo and
parcel post which have a bona fide ultimate neutral destination,
subject to a possible quota limitation. In certified and convoyed
aircraft the neutral can al~o send to a belligerent anything or any
persons if both belligerents agree."
"In uncertified aircraft, the neutral may send any persons or
cargo to another neutral or to a belligerent subject to the risk of
interception by a belligerent."
"It is obvious, however, that important quantities of goods considered contraband of war may be carried by air." ( Genera1l CommentJ Draft Convention on the f<ights and Duties of Neutral Stat es
in Naval .and A erial W arJ (Harvard Law School, 1939) . 33
American Journal of International LawJ Supplem entJ (1939),

504, 757.)
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10.

f f7 orld

IP ar I I .

Docun1ents reveal that at the beginning of vVorld
vVar II belligerent tre atmen t of co ntraband of war
was to be pa tterned after the p ractices adopted in the
pe ri od 1916-1 918 in W or 1d War .I .
In varyi ng ways, the usual rules were stated by the
belligeren ts: 1) enemy goods are safe on a neutral
ship if they are not contraband, 2) neutral goods are
s ~1 fe even on an enemy ship if they are not contraband,
an d 3 ) neutral goods are safe on a neut ral ship but
only if they are not contraband.
•
Some countries stated that all goods are contraband,
absolute contraband. Other countries published
elaborate lists of contraband, n1aking the distinction
between absolu te and conditional. But in reality,
rnost goods were treated as being absolute contraband,
for in total war the distinction between absolute and
conditional could not be tnaintained for long.
The doctrine of continuous voyage, as a result, was
no'v considered as being applicable to most goods
shipped from one neutral state to another, there being
no real distinction between absolute and condi tiona!
contraband.
The navicert system -vvas instituted immediately by ·
Great Britain and 'vas supplemented by a system of
mailcerts. Unlike the experience in World War I
little or no objection 'vas raised to this ptocedure by
the neutral states.
Cases involving neutral American ships and cargoes cannot be found because of the Neutrality Acts
'vhich prohibited the voyage of P_dnerican ships or
th e carriage of American-owned cargoes into defined
danger zones.
As the war progressed most of the nations of the
vvorld became involved in the vvar as belligerents.
The few neutral states that were left could not trade
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with each other without first submitting their ships
and cargoes to rigid examination in order to gain
navicerts.

•

1. " ... Now it must be clear .. , in particular in the light of
the problems and controversies raised by the World War, that there
is at present no generally agreed prize law in "regard to some of its
most important aspects. The controversy as to the legality or
otherwise of the conduct of war in this sphere by the A\llied Powers
is still raging. The various Governments have since maintained
their respective, and widely divergent, positions.· It would not
therefore, it is believed, be consistent with the function of an impartial science of International Law to maintain that there exists
at pres,ent a working body of generally agreed rules of prize law, in
particular in its bearing upon the rights and duties of neutrals.
l--Iistorically prize law has been, in this matter, a compromise between two conflicting principles: the freedom of neutral trade
and the right of the belligerent to prevent such commerce with
the opposing party as might be of military advantage to the latter.
International Law has not evolved any overriding principle reconciling these claims in cases when they show a tendency to conflict. The compromise has frequently been the function of the
relative military and political strength of the belligerents and
neutrals. This absence of an overriding principle sho,vs itself in the
hitherto unsolved difficulty, which proved of crucial importance
during the World War, of answering the question as to whether
the belligerents or the neutrals ought to bear the brunt of the
changed conditions of modern warfare." (Oppenheim's I nternational Law~ · (6th edition, by Lauterpacht, 1940), 736-7.)
2. " . . . His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
intend to use their best endeavours to facilitate innocent neutral
trade so far as is consonant with their determination to prevent contraband goods reaching the enemy. They will be compelled to use
their belligerent rights to the full, but they will at all times be ready
to consider sympathetically any suggestions put forward by neutral
governments designed to facilitate their bona fide trade.
"In order to secure their objects, His Majesty's Government
have established contraband control bases at Weymouth, Ramsgate,
Kirkwall, Gibraltar and Haifa. Vessels bound for enemy territory or neutral ports affording convenient means of access thereto
are urgently advised to call voluntarily at the appropriate base, in
order that their papers may be examined, and that, 'vhen it has
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been established that they are not carrying contraband of war, they
may be given a pass to facilitate the remainder of their voyage. Any
vessel which does not call voluntarily will be liable to be diverted
to a Contraband Control base if an adequate search by His
Majesty's ships at sea is not practicable.
"Every effort -vvill be made to expedite the examination of vessels,
particularly those -vvhich call voluntarily for the purpose." (British
Ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian, to Secretary of
State Hull, Sept. 10, 1939. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of Internatio nal LawJ VII, 7-8.)
3. "1. We have noted the statement in the Embassy's note of
September 10, that it is the intention of the British Government 'to use their best endeavors to facilitate innocent neutral
trade so far as is consonant with their determination to prevent
contraband goods reaching the enemy.'
"2. This Government on its part desires· that its trade with
neutral countries proceed with the least possible disturbance due
to the existence of a state of war in Europe. As regards trade of
neutral countries (in particular the so-called northern neutrals)
with the United States, it should be fully understood, as has already been publicly announced, that this Government reserves all
rights of the United States and its nationals under international
law and is not to be understood as eNdorsing any principle of
interference with trade of genuine neutral character." (Department of State to the British Embassy, Sept. 1939, as quoted in a
telegram from Secretary of State Hull to Ambassador Kennedy
on Sept. 29, 1939. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International
LawJ VII, 8.)
.
4. " ... The Ministry of Economic Warfare is concerned in the
first instance with only two questions: the character of the goods
and the character of the consignee."
"If ... the goods are of such a nature that there is danger that
the goods might be sent on to Germany and thus give comfort and
assistance to the enemy, either by the export of the goods themselves or by the release of other commodities for export to Germany,
then the goods are submitted to closer inspection and the character
of the consignee comes into question. If the character of the consignee is such that the British Government is satisfied that he
'vill not ship the goods to Germany, then the goods are released.
This is accomplished sometimes by a guarantee given by the firm,
sometimes by a guarantee given by the neutral country to which
the goods are consigned, sometimes by both. The fact how·ever that
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such guarantees are given is not in itself sufficient in many cases
to cause the release of the goods. . . . " (American commercial
attache in Great Britain, Dye, to Secretary of State Hull in regard
to British practice in detaining cargoes destined for Europe, Dec.,
1939. Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ VII, 8.)
( 1) Contraband ListsJ Asbolut~ and Conditional.

1. "The I tal ian War Law of July 1938 continues to adhere to
that country's abandonment of the distinction between absolute
and conditional contraband. . . ." (Comment in Hackworth,
G. H., Digest of International LawJ VII, 41.)

2. Article 22 of the German Prize Law Code of
August 28, 1939 declared:
" ( 1) To be considered as contraband (absolute contraband) are
all articles and rna terials which :
"1. Directly serve the land, naval or air armament and
"2. Are consigned to the enemy territory or the enemy forces."

A few days after the outbreak of war, article 22 was
changed, reading as follows:
"The following articles and materials will be regarded as contraband (absolute contraband) if they are destined for enemy territory or the enemy forces:
a One. Arms of all kinds, their component parts and their accessones.
aTwo. Ammunition and parts thereof, bombs, torpedoes, mines
and other types of projectiles; appliances to be used for the shooting
or dropping of these projectiles; powder and explosives including
detonators and igniting materials.
ay hree. Warships of all kinds, their component parts and their
accessones.
aFour. Military aircraft of all kinds, their component parts
and their accessories ; airplane engines.
a Five. Tanks, armored cars and armored trains; armor plate of
all kinds.
a Six. Chemical substances for -military purposes, appliances and
machines used for shooting or spreading them.

aSeven. Articles of military clothing and equipment.
a Eight.
Means of communication, signaling and military illumination and their component parts.
aNine. Means of transportation and their component parts.
aTen. Fuels and heating substances of all kinds, lubricating oils.
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u Eleven. Gold, Silver, means of payment, evidences of indebtedness.
uTwelve. Apparatus, tools, machines and materials for the
manufacture or for the utilization of the articles and products
named in numbers one to eleven."

On Sept. 12, 1939, the following declaration \vas
n1ade by the German Government:
"The following articles and materials 'vill be regarded as contraband (conditional contraband) subject to the conditions of article
24 of the Prize Law Code of August 28, 1939 ( Reichsegesetzblatt
part one page 1585) :
"Foodstuffs (including live animals) beverages and tobacco and
the like, fodder and clothing; articles and materials used for their
preparation or manufacture." (Department of State Bulletin_, I,
No. 13, Sept. 23, 1939, 285.)

3. Great Britain proclain1ed the following contraband list in Sept. 1939:
"ScHEDULE

I

.... Absolute Contraband
" (a) All kinds of arms, ammun1twn, explosives, chemicals, or
appliances suitable for use in chemical ·warfare and machines for
their manufacture or repair; component parts thereof; articles
necessary or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients used
in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
"(b) Fuel of all kinds; all contrivances for, or means of, transportation on land, in the water or air, and machines used in their
manufacture or repair; component parts thereof, instruments, articles, or animals necessary or convenient for their use; materials or
ingredients used in their manufacture; articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients.
" (c) All means of communication, tools, implements, instruments, equipment, maps, pictures, papers and other articles, machines, or documents necessary or convenient for carrying on hostile
operation; articles necessary or convenient for their manufacture
or use.
" (d) Coin, bullion, currency, evidences of debt; also metal,
materials, dies, plates, machinery, or other articles necessary or
convenient for their manufacture."
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"ScHEDULE
rr

II

Conditional Contna1b and

" (e) A~l kinds of food, foodstuffs, feed, forage, and clothing
and articles and materials us~d in their production." (Department
of State Bulletin_, I, No 12, Sept. 13, 1939, 250-1. Canada adopted
the same list, and France had a similar list.)

4. In the course of giving a decision in the case
of The Minna} the German Prize Court of Hamburg
on December 14, 1939 said:
" ... It may be considered as correct that the Zellstoff-Werke of
Reval manufacture exclusively such unbleached strong sulphite
woodpulp and that this material normally serves in general for
the manufacture of paper at paper mills. It is also correct that
the use of such unbleached strong sulphite woodpulp for the manufacture of explosives is not possible without further processing.
This, however, is not decisive. Mr. Almberg himself admits that
theoretically such woodpulp may be used in the manufacture of
explosives by dissolving the woodpulp, treating it with chloride,
bleaching it and then drying it."
'..'This processing, termed by Mr. Almberg a 'theoretical possibility' does not, however, lie beyond the limits of practicability. The
convincing opinion of an expert, Dr. Gaertner, scientific adviser
of the State Chemical Institute· of Hamburg proves that in practice
such reprocessing is being carried out to a great extent.... "
"In any case, whether or not it is a 'substance for the manufacture of munitions, explosives, et cetera' within the meaning of
Nos. 12 and 2 of the German list of absolute contraband can by
no means be determined by the question of whether the material
under investigation is specially suitable or even intended for such
processing. Just as little may economic c?nsiderations as to its suitability play a decisive part, especially since in war-time special
conditions \Vould be considered uneconomic but which are unavoidable during war. For the P:r:ize Court the only criterion is the
objective adaptability (" objecktive Verwendbarkeit") of the material under consideration to the manufacture of articles and
products listed as absolute contraband." (The Minna_, 1939. T'Jze
Minna" s cargo of wopdpulp, shipped from Estonia and consigned
to the United States, was condemned as absolute contraband because
The Minna intended to stop for coal in England, enemy territory.
Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law_, VII, 27-8.)
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5. On O ctober 3, 1939, the Foreign Ministers of
the A tneri can Re p u blics in a meeting held in Panama
r.esol ved :
" 1.

1~o register its opposition to the placing of foodstuffs and

cloth ing intended for civilian populations, not destined directly
or indirectly for the use of a bellige rent government or its armed
forces, on lists of contraband." (R eport of the D elegate of the
U nited States of A m erica to th e M eeting of t he Foreign Ministers
of th e A m erican R epublics~ Held at Pan ama~ S eptember 23-0ct ober 3, 1939. Department of State Conference Ser. 44, 1940, 58-9.
H ackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII , 27 . )
6. "Objections to the British and French contraband list of 1939
·were set forth by the Netherlands Government in notes to the
Governments of the two countries in which it w as asserted that by
the inclusion, in addition to specified articles, of 'articles necessary
or convenient for their use; materials or ingredients serving in their
manufacture' and 'articles necessary or convenient for the production or use of such materials or ingredients,' the field of goods
considered contraband could be extended to the infinite."
"The distinction between absolute and conditional contraband
"\vas said to be based upon reason and to have long been recognized
by international law, and it was protested that under these lists
articles indispensable to the life of the whole nation in matters
unrelated to the military apparatus could be treated as absolute
contraband. It was insisted that the limitations imposed by international lavv, which directly affected the rights and interests of
neutrals, should not be lost sight of and that, since the belligerent
right to seize contraband vvas an exception to the principle of
freedom of the seas, it should be interpreted in a restrictive manner." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of InternationalLaw~ VII, 26.)
7. "The British Government replied on Nov. 20, 1939 to the
N etherlaqds Minister in London stating that the list of absolute
contraband could not be regarded as unduly extensive in vievv of the
number of articles now regarded as of direct military use and
particularly in view of the certainty that any such articles imported
by Germany would be intended for military purposes. Adherence
to the distinction bet"\veen absolute and conditional contraband was
promised. It was asserted :
"' . . . It is the undoubted right in international law of a belligerent Power to -declare \vhat articles it \vill consider as contra-

94
band, within the general definition of contraband as being any
article of use for the prosecution of the war.' " (Comment in
Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 26.)
8. In the case of the Hakosaski Maru~ the French Prize Council
"held on May 22, 1940 that food (conditional contraband) destined to Germany should be condemned as condi tiona! contraband
having host.ile destination in view of the extent to which the state
controlled the distribution of food." (Hakosaki Maru. 1940. Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law, VII, 70.)
9. In Great Britain in the case of The A lwaki and Other Ships~
194-0, the British Prize Court arrived at a conclusion similar to
that in The Hakan. For The Hakan see above under World War
I. (The Alwaki and Other Ships~ 1940. I Lloyd~s Prize Cases
(2d), 43, 46. See also Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International
L:a:w~ VII, 68.)
10. "In declaring its contraband list in 1940, the Italian Government refer~ed to the fact that the British and French lists went
beyond the list announced in the Italian Laws of War of July 8,
1938, and it included all articles on the British and French lists."
(Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ
VII, 26.)
11. "The reply of the Netherlands Minister, Jan. 12, 1940, while
recognizing that 'the centralization and subordination of all the
means of the nation to the purposes of war may involve certain
consequences' as to rules regarding contraband which originated
in a different epoch, stated that 'These considerations ... cannot
justify the treatment as absolute contraband of goods or of materials
which by their nature can serve the needs of the civil population
as well as those of the armed force.' While refraining from expressing an opinion on the statement in the British note (quoted ante),
the Nether lands l\r1inister expressed the belief that such an extreme
extension as that adopted by Great Britain and France had the
effect of nullifying article 2 of the Declaration of Paris, under
which the neutral flag covers enemy goods with th~ exception of
contraband, 'by making almost all imaginable goods fall within the
category of contraband.' " (Comment in Hackworth, G. H.,
Digest of International Law, VII, 27.)
12. "In 1940 the German Prize Court at Hamburg held that
sawed timber and telegraph poles were contraband because they
could be used in the construction of military equipment." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law~ VII, 28.)
(2) Destination-Continuous Voyage.

•
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1. " T'he F re nch instructions of l\1ar. 8, l 934 provide in article
46 th at articles of cond iti onal co ntra band desti ned for the use of
the anned forces or administ ration are subject to condemnation
,vheth er or not th e transport ing vessel is destined for a· neutral
port or the cargo is documented fo r such port. A n absolute presump tion of enemy des tination is es tablished vvhen the goods are
consigned to an enemy agent, whether in an enemy or neutral port,
or are destined to an enemy fortified place or base of supply ( ar.
48). When the enemy government has taken measures to requisition or to control the distrubution of certain goods, a rebuttable
presumption is established (art. 4 7) in the followin g cases: ( 1)
,vhen the goods are documented to an enemy port; ( 2) when they
a re documented to a neutral port and the vessel is first to touch
at an e~emy port or meet the enemy forces; ( 3) when they are documented to a neutral port 'vhich habitually serves as a port of transit to the enemy country and the goods are consigned to order or
the consignee in the neutral country is not named." (Comment in
Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International Law_, VII, 41.)

2. I tali an War Law of July 1938. "A hostile destination is considered (art. 161) to be the enemy forces or terri tory belonging to
or occupied by the enemy. A rebuttable presumption of such destination is established when the documents indicate that the goods
are consigned to the enemy forces or are to be disembarked in an
enemy port or one occupied by its forces. The presumption applies
"vhen the goods are destined to a neutral port but the vessel approaches or touches at a port of or occupied by the enemy, or meets
the e~emy armed forces before arriving at the neutral port." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H ·., Digest of International Law_, VII, 41.)

3. German Prize Ordinance of August 28,1939, article 24 (2) :
"On condition of reciprocal procedure on the part of the enemy
the articles and materials named in par. 1 [conditional contraband]
vvill not be considered as contraband if they are to be discharged
in a neutral port." (Hackworth, G. H., Digest of Interna t io nal
Law_, VII, 42.)
4. "In the case of the City of Joliet the French Prize Council
on May 22, 1940 held that copper consigned 'to order' to the neutral port ·of Antwerp should be condemned, since its ultimate
German destination was to be presumed from a consignment 'to
order' to the neutral port of Antwerp should be condemned , since
its ultimate German destination was to be presumed from a consignment 'to order' to a port serving as a port of transit for Ger-
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many." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International
LawJ VII, 41.)
5. "A cargo of hides shipped before the outbreak of war in 1939
from East Africa to the Italian port of Trieste and consigned 'to
order' for the Yugoslav branch of a firm in Czechoslovakia was held
by the French Prize Council, in the case of the EddaJ on May 15,
1940, to be contraband with an enemy destination. The Prize
Council referred to Czechoslovakia as territory under enemy occupation and held that the presumption of enemy destination arose
from the consignment 'to order' to a neutral port serving as a
normal port of transit to enemy territory." (Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ VII, 41.)
6. "In the case of the Tormes the French Prize Council held on
June 5, 1940 that a cargo of lemons shipped 'to order' and destined
for Genoa should be condemned as conditional contraband. The
Council found that Genoa was customary port of transit for goods
bound to Germany and, in view of the German Government's
control of food, held that the conditional contraband should be
treated as if it had been consigned to the German Government."
(Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest of International LawJ
VII, 41.)

( 3) Destination-Refinements.

(a) Intervening belligerent port. In the case of
TheM inna} the Hamburg Prize Court found ~hat the
wood pulp cargo of this ship, although destined from
Estonia to the United States, was absolute contra band
and should be condemned since the ship had intended
to stop at a British port for coal. The court declared:
"On account of the existing possibility of interference on the
part of the enemy as well as the absence of any reliable control
in cases of this nature, it has for long been an accepted principle
of international legislation to presume enemy destination for absolute contraband, as contained in Article 23 ( 3) of the Prize La,v.
Neutral countries suffering under this necessary and justifiable
assumption, therefore, are not confronted by any surprising and
consequently unfair novelty biit by an old, frequently practised
custom of international law, which they must be supposed to kno\v
and take into account."
"A vessel carrying absolute contraband, the captain of which
seriously contemplates a choice betw·een two possibilities open to
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him including touching an enemy port of call, must be treated
under P rize L aw as a vessel, the master of which has already decided to touch at an enemy port. It must, therefore, be sufficient
under the law th at calling at such a port was at the time of capture
still conditional but could at any moment lose its alternative character and by the captain's final decision become direct steering for
and touching at the enemy por t . For obvious reasons it cannot possibly be expected of a belligerent country in such cases to submit
to the risk of immediate enemy interference and to permit a vessel
laden with absolute contrab and to proceed unmolested on its
way." (Hackworth, G. H., Digest of I n terna,t ional Law~ VII,
49.)

( 4) N avicerts and M alcerts.
1. " In November of 1939 British representatives announced the
inauguration of the navicert system for inter-neutral trade betw een
the United States and specified European neutral countries. U n der
the system the neutral exporter filled out a form giving particulars
as to the shipment and consignee, and the form was signed by
British representatives. It was carried in the same vessel with the
goods to enable favorable and speedy treatment by the British
Contraband Control. In discussions with the British Embassy,
the Department of State took the position that the system could
only be regarded as a purely voluntary one for the benefit of
exporters who might desire to take advantage of it. It reserved
all rights of the United States and its nationals under il!_ternational
law and stated that it did not desire to take any position at the
time vvith respect to the introduction of the proposed system. The
Department made it clear that such comments were based upon the
assumption of the correctness of the following assertions:

" '1. The proposed Navicert System will in no sense be used to
interfere in any way with the normal volume of exports of genuine
neutral character from the United States to any neutral country.
" '2. The proposed Navicert System will not be used in any way
to discriminate against the United States and United States exporters.
" '3. The granting or rejection of a Navicert shall be conditional
upon circumstances related solely to the character of the goods
and conditions in the country of importation and in no respect upon
conditions related to American exporters or to the United States.
" '4. Whenever applications for N avicerts are rejected a clear,
concise statement of the reasons for such rejections shall be given
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to the applicant for the Navicert.'" (Memorandum, Nov. 9, 1939,
Department of State. Comment in Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest
of International Law_, VII, 215- 6.)
2. " ... the 'Navicert' system operates by voluntary application on
the part of American exporters. No obligation is imposed upon any
American exporter to apply for or to refrain from applying for a
'.K avicert'. The United States Government is not responsible for
nor connected 'v-ith the operation of the system. It has announced
publicly and has informed the British Government that it reserves
the right of the U ~ited States and its nationals under International
La,v." (The Legal Adviser of the Department of State, -Hack'vorth, to Fred Christoph, January 31, 1940. Hack,vorth, G. H.,
Digest of International La~u_, VII, 216.)

3. "On Jan. 17, 1940 the l\!Iinister of Economic Warfare
( Cross) explained in the House of Commons that 'Over 11,000
app_lications for navicerts had been received since the system 'vas
introduced on November 1 [ 1939], and applications were coming
fonvard at the rate of 500 a day.'" (Times_, (London), Jan. 18,
1940, p. 3, col. 3. Comment in Hack,vorth, G. H., Digest of International Law_, VII, 216.)

4. "On Feb. 29, 1940 the German Legation at The Hague 'varned neutrals against accepting British navicerts. Similar 'varnings
were issued at Berlin an~ at The Hague on the follo,ving days."
( Times (London), Mar. 1, 1940, p. 8, col. 4. New York Times_,
Mar. 1, 1940, p. 8, col. 6; Ibid._, Mar. 2, 1940, p, 4, col: 8; Ibid_,·
Tvlar. 5, 19+0, p. 5, col. 4. Comment in Hackworth, G. H., Digest
of International Law} VII, 216).

5. A British Order in Council, July 31, 1940, effective August 1,
1940 stated that Germany had violated the la,vs of maritime 'varfare. After provid.ing for the issuance of "ship navicerts" by British
or allied authorities ·at British, allied, and neutral ports, this Order
by 'vay of reprisals declared:
"2. Any vessel on her 'vay to or from a port through ,vhich goods
might reach or come from enemy territory or the enemy armed
forces, not being provided 'vith a Ship Navicert valid for the
voyage on ,vhich she is engaged, shall, until the contrary is established, be deemed to be carrying contraband or goods of enemy
origin or o'vnership, and shall be liable to seizure as Prize; provided
that a vessel, other than a vessel 'vhich sailed from or has called
at an enemy port, shall not be liable to seizure under the provisions
of this Article unless she sailed from or could have called at a
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port at which she \\·auld, if duly qualified, have obtained a Ship
X avicert."
''8. ::\"a thing in this Order shall be deemed to confer any immunity from detention, seizure or condemnation on any vessel or goods
by reason of being provided ,,·ith or co\·ered by any form of pass
or permit." ( Stf!-1 utor;· Rules and 0 rdersJ 19+0, no. 1+36. Hack\\·orth, G. H., D igest of International L awJ \ 1 II, 217.)

6. Further articles from the Order in C ouncil of July 31, 19+0:
" 3.- ( 1) G oods consigned to any port or place from ,....-hich they
might reach enemy territory or the enemy armed forces, and not
co\·ered by a valid Cargo X a\·icert or, in the case of goods shipped
from a British or Allied port, by a ....-alid E xport or Transshipment
License, ,,·here such License is required , shall, until the contrary
is established, be deemed to ha,·e an enemy destination.
" ( 2 ) Goods shipped from any port from "·hich goods of enemy
origin or o\\·nership might haYe been shipped, and not co....-ered by
a valid Certificate of Origin and Interest, shall, until the contrary
is established, be deemed to be of enemy origin or o\\-nership.
"4. G oods of enemy origin or o\\-nership shall be liable to condemnation.
" 5. P-'-ny ,·essel seized under Article 2 hereof and carrying
contraband or goods of enemy origin or O\\nership shall be liable
to condemnation in respect of such carriage." ( Statu tor)' R ules and
OrdersJ 19+0, no. 1+36. Hacb,-orth, G. H. , D igest of International
La,,, ·vii, 141- 2. )
7. " On July 1, 19+1 the British GoYernment instituted a system
of 'mailcerts' for parcels mailed from the United States to various
European and African countries. The British ~Iinistry of Economic
7
\ \ arfare stated that the purpose \Vas to enable the senders of such
parcels 'to ascertain, in advance of posting . . . . -hether facili ties can be
given for their passage through British examination stations.' "
( Counselor of Embassy in London, Johnson, to Secretary of State
Hull, enclosure, July 9, 19+1. Comment in Hacb,-orth, G. H. , D igest of International Law_, \TII, 216. )

11. Conclusions.
Despite the relative scarcity of aYailable docun1ents
for 'lF or ld \\r ar I I in regard to contra band, \Ye can
state as a conclusion that contraband of \Yar still
remains a Yalid concept. ...\s n1ethods of \Yarfare
changed, the general classification of goods as contra-
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band has been expanded and the means of determining such goods have been refined, but as long as
there remains a neutral country in time of war, the
question of contraband will arise.
As the concept stands today, the pro~lem of contraband will be found whenever neutral goods are
shipped aboard a neutral or an enemy ship or whenever enemy goods are found upon a neutral vessel.
The essential criteria of contraband remain: 1) the
belligerent character of the goods, and 2) hostile
destination.
II. THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE
(The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XII, No. 295, Feb. 18, 1945)

For the past eight days, Winston S. Churchill,
Prime Minister of Great Britain, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, a~d
Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of
People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, have met with the Foreign Secretaries,
Chiefs of Staff, and other advisors in the Crimea.
In addition to the three heads of government, the
following took part in the conference:
For the United States of America:
Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Secretary of State
Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to
the President
Harry L. Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President
Justice James F. Byrnes, Di.rector, Office of War Mobilization
and Reconversion
General of the Army George C. Marshall, U.S.A., Chief of
Staff, U. S. Army
Fleet Admiral Ernest]. King, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet
Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces
\~ i ce A.dmiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator

